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THE PECULIAR ROLE OF THE DELAWARE COURTS IN
T H E COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS

Jill E. Fisch·
More large publicly-traded corporations are incorporated in
Delaware than in any other state. 1 Since the early 1900s, Delaware has
been the dominant choice as state of incorporation for the largest U.S.
companies. 2 Almost half the companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and nearly 60% of Fortune 500 companies have chosen to
incorporate in Delaware. 3 This success in attracting corporate charters
has been profitable; incorporations bring Delaware approximately $440
million per year in franchise taxes and related fees. 4
Scholars continually attempt to explain Delaware's success. 5
Reasoning that the choice of a state of incorporation involves the
selection of a body of corporate law, they posit that the incorporation
statistics reflect a preference for Delaware law. Although there is
disagreement in the academic community as to whether this process
leads to the selection of a value-maximizing body of corporate law or
one that permits management self-dealing at the expense of shareholders
or other corporate constituencies, scholars agree that the process is
appropriately characterized as regulatory competition. 6 States compete
for corporate charters by offering variations in corporate law. Whether

* Professor, Fordham Law School.© 2000Jill E. Fisch. Prepared for the UniversityofCincinnati
School of Law 2000 Corporate Law Symposium on Contemporary Issues in the Law of Business
Organizations. I am grateful to Susan Block-Lieb, Ehud Kamar, Neil Komesar, and Steve The! for helpful
comments on an earlier draft. I have also benefited greatly from discussions with justice Randy Holland.
I. See, e.g., De me trios G. Kaouris, Is DelawartStill a Haven for lncorpuration?, 20 DEL.]. CORP. L. 965,
1010 (1995) (stating that "Delaware remains the preeminent state for incorporation" for publicly traded
companies).
2. See ul. at 969-71 (explaining Delaware's rise to prominence in 1913 when New Jersey passed
legislation effectively outlawing trusts and holding companies).
3. See, e.g., Sara-Ellen Amster, Bureaucrats 1\1oveMoneyAraund Gwb~all.fromDelaware, WIL\1INGTON
NEWS-]., March 24, 1998;
Delaware Division of Corpurations 0ast modified Feb. I, 2000)
<http:/ /www.state.de.us/corp/index.htm> (Web page of the Secretary of State stating that more than
310,000 companies are incorporated in Delaware including 60% of Fortune 500 and 50% of New York
Stock Exchange companies).
4. See Sara-Ellen Amster, Others Try wImilalL Delaware, WIL\Ili\'GTON NEWS·J,July 7, 1998.
5. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a ProducL· Some Pieces oftk Incorporation Pu;;zu, I J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225 (1985); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group 17uory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Ehud Kamar, A Regulalmy Competilion 17uory of Inde!Lrminacy in
CorjJoral£ Law, 98 COLU:\1. L. REV. 1908 (1998); William]. Carney, 17u Production ofCorporalL Law, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Enhance Finn Value) (Working Paper 1999).
6. See, e.g., Kamar, supra note 5, at 1909 (describing consensus that corporate law has bred a system
of regulatory competition and disagreement about whether the competition results in a race to the top or
to the bottom).
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the competition is described as a race to the bottom or a race to the top,
Delaware emerges as the undisputed winner.
Several factors, however, weaken the explanatory power of the
regulatory competition model. First, variations in state corporation laws
are minimal. 7 If there are few substantive differences between Delaware
law and that of other states, it is difficult to understand the incorporation
decision as reflecting a preference for Delaware law. Second, empirical
analysis fails to demonstrate the superiority or inferiority ofDelaware's
substantive law. For example, studies indicate that state antitakeover
statutes reduce shareholder value. 8 A race to the top theory would
therefore predict that Delaware would not adopt an anti takeover statute;
a race to the bottom theory would predict the adoption of a strong
antitakeover statute. In fact, Delaware has opted for a middle ground
and adopted a moderate antitakeover statute that is not adequately
explained by either theory. Third, Delaware's advantage in attracting
charters seems immune from competition. Despite efforts to enter the
race, other states appear to be unable to compete. 9 Indeed closer
examination reveals regulatory competition to be essentially a two horse
race. Corporations choose between incorporating in their home state
and incorporating in Delaware. 10 Virtually no corporation chooses any
other alternative.
Importantly, choosing to incorporate in Delaware is not costless.
Delaware's franchise fees for large corporations are significantly higher
than those imposed by any other state. The largest corporations pay
$150,000 a year for the privilege of incorporating in Delaware. 11
Although these fees may not be financially material for a Fortune 500
company, Delaware's continued ability to impose fees substantially in
excess of those charged by other states suggests that Delaware
incorporation offers nontrivial value. 12 In other words, it suggests that
the corporate preference for Delaware is real.
As a result, scholars have continued their efforts to explain this
preference by looking beyond substantive difierences in Delaware

7. See, e.g., Carney, suj1ra note 5, at 729-34 (concluding that corpo rJ.te law is relatively uniform).
8. See, e.g., William W . Bratton &Joseph A. McCahery, Regullllmy Competition, Regulatory Caj;lure, rmd
CurjJuralde!fRegulalinn, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1881 n.65 (1995) (describing "[a] large body of empirical
work [that) confirms that the antitakeovcr statutes had a harmful effect on shareholder value").
9. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalu7n a/1(1 CorporalL Lnw: Rifkctinns Upon Delaware, 83 YA!.ELJ. 663,
665 (1974).
10. See Daines, supra note 5.
11. See Delaware Division of Corpuralinns Scludule of Franchise Tax, 0ast modified Feb. 26, 1999)
<http:/ /www.state.de.us/ corp / sch-tax.htm> (describing the maximum annual franchi se tax asS 150,000).
12 . See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market fo r Corporate Law
(Working Paper, Sept. 22, 1999 draft).
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corporate law. For example, commentators have developed transaction
cost models of Delaware law, 13 arguing that Delaware reduces
regulatory costs because of network externalities, 14 its commitment to
regulatory responsiveness, 15 and the superiority of specialized chancery
courts. 16 These alternatives provide explanations for Delaware's success
that do not depend on proof that Delaware law is substantively superior.
Many of the nonsubstantive explanations look to Delaware's body of
case law as an important advantage. 17 The large volume of business
litigation in Delaware, coupled with Delaware's specialized court
system, results in a well developed collection of corporate law
precedents. Commentators have argued that this collection may
account both for Delaware's competitive success and the inability of
other states to duplicate that success. 18 It is accepted legal lore that well
developed precedent is particularly valuable to business decisionmaking.
Legal rules that are easy to ascertain, with predictable consequences,
reduce the cost ofbusiness transactions. 19
A closer look at Delaware precedent reveals, however, that, although
well developed, it is far from clear and predictable. 20 Recent work
demonstrates a degree of indeterminacy in Delaware law that casts
substantial doubt on the transaction cost model. 21 Because of this
indeterminacy, it has been suggested that Delaware case law may
impose excessive costs on Delaware corporations. 22 This finding

13. But see Bernard S. Black, Is CorporaiL Law T mini': A Political and Economic Ana{ysis, 84 Nw. U . L.
REV. 542, 585-89 (1990) (questioning R omano's transaction cost explanation for Delaware's success).
14. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardi<,atinn and Innovation in CorporaiL Contracting
(or "Tie Economics'![ Boilerpla!L"), 83 VA. L. RJ::V. 713, 763-64 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations,
CorpomiL Law, rmd Networks '![Contract, 81 VA. L. REV. 75 7 (1995).
15. See, e.g., ROBERTA RO~l.t'-''10, THE GJ::KIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
16. See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and tlu Market for Corporate Chmters: History and Agenry, 15 DEL.].
CORP. L. 885, 918 (1990) (arguing that specialized judiciary makes Delaware incorporation more
a ttrac tive); Black, supra note 13 at 589-90 (arguing that Delaware's prominence is due to the expertise o f
its judiciary).
I 7. See, e.g., Stephen]. Massey, Chancellor Allen's Jurisprudence and tlre Tieory '![Corporate Law, I 7 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 683,702 n.79 (1992) (describing scholars' reliance on Delaware case law as an explanation for
iL~ compe titive success).
18. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Tie StaU Comptiilion Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709,
772 (1987).
19. See, e.g., Henry G. Mann e , Tie)udi.d.ary and Free }v/arkets, 21 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y II, 18
( 1997) (desc ribing how system in which law is settled through well-devel o ped precedent reduces transaction
costs for business and increases soc ia l capital).
20. See, e.g., Kamar, supra no te 5; Do uglas M. Branson, lnde!Lrminary: Tie Final Ingrediml in an Interest
Group Ana!ysis '![Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85, (1990).

21. See id.
22. See Kamar, supra note 5, at 1919-22 (suggesting that the amount of indeterminacy in Delaware
law may be suboptimal and impose excessive costs on business decisionmakers).
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presents a puzzle to those who seek to explain the dominance of
Delaware incorporation.
This article offers a solution to the puzzle and an alternative
explanation for Delaware's success in attracting corporate charters-the
unique lawmaking function of the Delaware courts. The article focuses
on the peculiar role of the Delaware judiciary in corporate lawmaking,
a role that has received little attention from corporate law scholars. The
article demonstrates that Delaware uses an unusual process to make
corporate law. Delaware relies heavily on judge-made law, but the
structure and operation of the Delaware courts causes Delaware's
judicial lawmaking to differ from that in other states. Indeed, the
process by which Delaware courts make corporate law resembles
legislation in some ways. 23
The article then evaluates this lawmaking structure from a standpoint
of comparative institutional advantage. In particular, the article
compares Delaware's process to the political process. The article
concludes that Delaware lawmaking offers Delaware corporations a
variety of benefits, including flexibility, responsiveness, insulation from
undue political influence, and transparency. These benefits increase
Delaware's ability to adjust its corporate law to changes in the business
world. By identifying the role of the Delaware courts as central to
Delaware's dominance of the market for corporate charters, this article
has important implications for the application ofDelaware's success to
continuing questions of regulatory design.
I. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND THE CARY-WINTER DEBATE

Analysis of regulatory competition in corporate law begins with the
classic Cary-Winter debate. In 1974, William Cary published a seminal
article identifying Delaware's leadership status as a corporate domicile. 24
Cary analyzed Delaware's success and concluded that, because of its
substantial reliance on corporate franchise taxes, Delaware deliberately
sought to attract corporate charters. Moreover, because the choice of
state of incorporation is made by management, Cary posited that
Delaware structured its corporation law to appeal to corporate
management. According to Cary, the result was lax legal standards that
favored management interests over those of shareholders. Cary termed

23. Set, e.g.,Jill E. Fisch, RetroactiuiJy and ugal Cfumgt: An Equilibrium Approach, II 0 HARV. L. REv.
I OSS, 1107 ·8 ( 1997) (developing description of traditional process of judicial lawmaking and contrasting
that process with adjudication that closely resembles legislative lawmaking).
24. See Cary, supra note 9.
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the competition a "race to the bottom" and recommended federal
minimum standards to stop the race. 25
Cary's conclusions were challenged, most famously by Judge Ralph
Winter. 26 \Vhile agreeing with Cary's observation of regulatory
competition in corporate law, vVinter argued that the competition was
more accurately described as a "race to the top." Significantly, Winter
argued that market constraints preclude managers from sacrificing
shareholder interests by choosing a domicile with inferior rules of
corporate law. Indeed, the markets within which firms operate create
incentives for managers to choose the corporate law that maximizes firm
value.
Corporate law scholars have aligned themselves with Cary or vVinter
and expanded on the analysis of regulatory competition. Lucian
Bebchuk, for example, agrees ·with Cary that at least some aspects of
regulatory competition are value-decreasing. 27 Bebchuk warns t..~at state
competition is unlikely to produce efficient rules governing "issues that
are 'significantly redistributive';" issues that directly affect the strength
of the market, particularly takeover regulation; and issues that implicate
the interests of third parties. 28 Accordingly Bebchuk argues that Cary
correctly concludes that state competition will, in some cases, cause
states to provide legal rules that favor manager interests over those of
shareholders. In his most recent work, Bebchuk, together with Allen
Ferrell, argues that states have produced bad takeover law and suggests
that takeover regulation is not an isolated example of the failure of
regulatory competition but rather a reason to give greater credence to
Cary's analysis. 29 William Bratton andj oseph McCahery offer a similar
perspective, describing charter competition as an example of regulatory
capture by corporate management and explaining that, as a result of this
capture, state competition is unlikely to produce optimal corporate
law.30
Most corporate law scholars, however, align themselves with Winter.
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, for example, concur in Winter's
assessment that market factors are likely to result in corporate law

25. !d. at 666, 696-705.
26. See Ralph K. Winter,Jr., Stale LmJJ, Slumholder Protectwn, and the 77teory rifthe Corporation, 6]. LEGAL
STUD. 251 ( 19 77 ).
27. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Ftdt'Talism and the Corporation: 77te Desirable Limits on Sta!e Competition in
Curporate u1w, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992).
28. See Lucian A rye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corpora!e Law: 77te Race to ProtectManagm
.from Takeovers, 99 COLlJYI. L. REV. 1168, 1172-73 (1999) (desc ribing Bebchuk's earlier analysis).
29. See id.
30. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 8, at 1862.
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m aximizing firm value. 3 1 Roberta Romano argues that an extensive
body of empirical work demonstrates the success of regulatory
competition in producing a body of corporate law that increases firm
value. Indeed Romano goes so far as to defend the federalist structure
that results in regulatory competition as "The Genius of American
Corporate Law." 32 Recent empirical work by Robert Daines lends
further support to Winter's assessment by demonstrating that Delaware
law increases firm value. 33
The regulatory competition model has important implications for
corporate law. Cary sought to predicate a defense of federal
incorporation or, at least, federal minimum standards, on his description
of regulatory competition as producing a race to the bottom. 34 Romano,
in contrast, uses her defense of state competition to argue against federal
regulation oftakeovers. 35 In fact, Romano asserts that the demonstrated
success of regulatory competition in corporate law supports adoption of
a similar approach to securities regulation in place of the existing system
of mandatory national rules. 36
It is difficult, however, to explain Delaware's dominance in the
market for corporate charters on the basis of the substantive superiority
ofDelaware corporate law, whether substantive superiority is defined as
better for shareholders as in vVinter's view, or better for managers, as
Cary claimed. For one thing, state corporation statutes contain
relatively little substantive variation. Careful empirical research reveals
that corporate codes tend toward uniformity. 37
Even though
innovations may initially cause statutory differences, the statutes rapidly
converge. 38 Although convergence is a predictable result of regulatory

31. See, e.g., fRA.:'\1\. H. EASTERBROOK & DA;'.l EL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONO :O.II C STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATEL\W 1-40 (1991 ).
32. Romano, supra note 15.
33. See Dai nes, sujmz note 5 (concluding that firms whic h in co rporate in Delaware have statisti ca lly
higher Tobins Qs).
34. See C ary, supra note 9, at 70 l.
35. See Roma no , supra no te 15 , a t 75-84.
36. See R obe rta Romano, Empowering lnvestars: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE LJ.
2359 (1998); sec a lso Stephen]. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciproci.Jy: Rethinking the International
Reru·h of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 ( 1998) (arguin g that issue rs sho uld be able to choose
"'hich jurisd iction's di sclosure requirements apply to it).
37. See, e.g. , John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as Hi.rwry: The Prospecl.r j01' Global Convagence qfCMjJorau
Govmwnce and It.r Implications, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641, 702 (1999) (" the best documented finding in the
empirical literature on the U.S. corpora te charte rin g competition is that a high degree of uniformity has
emerged in Am erica n co rporate laws" ); Carney, supra note 5, at 717 (empirical study concluding that
American corpo rate law is "relatively uniform across most sta tes"); Romano, supra note 18, at 709 (finding
"substantial unifo rmity across the states").

38. See Carney, supra noteS , at 729-34.
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competition, Delaware's ability to dominate the market in light of this
convergence is less explicable. 39
In addition, evidence suggests that, although Delaware is successful
in attracting charters, its law is not optimal. Cary and Bebchuk have
noted a variety of ways in which Delaware law appears to favor
management interests at the expense of shareholder interests. 40
Bebchuk's more recent analysis of takeover regulation indicates that
Delaware's substantive law of takeovers is particularly problematic, an
analysis that is not contradicted by Romano's efforts to defend Delaware
law. 41 Romano and other scholars in the Winter camp agree that state
antitakeover regulation inefficiently interferes with the market for
corporate control, yet these scholars are unable to reconcile this
inefficiency with their defense of regulatory competition. 42 If states
compete for charters by offering superior products, it is difficult to
understand why competition has not addressed the observed problems
in Delaware law.
Indeed, if there is a competitive market for corporate charters, why
has no state been able to supplant Delaware by offering a superior
statute? To the contrary, no state has been able to duplicate Delaware's
success at attracting charters. Although other states have attempted to
compete by modeling their law after that ofDelaware, they are unable
to attract incorporations. 43 Cary and other commentators point to the
relatively recent effort by Nevada to become a "Delaware of the
West." 44 In addition to adopting the Delaware statute, the Nevada
legislature adopted Delaware case law. 45 Moreover, courts construing
Nevada law appear to follow Delaware precedent. 46 Nonetheless,

39. Bernard Black maintains that substantive corporate law is not merely uniform , it is trivial. See
Black, supra note 13.
40. See Bebchuk, supra note 27; Cary, supra note 9.
4 1. See Bcbchuk & Ferrell, supra note 28, at 1184-91 .
42. See id. at 1197. Bebchuk and Ferrell note that Romano 's defense of Delaware's a nti takeover
regulation consists of arguing I) "that Delaware ha.' been slow to adopt antitakeover legislatio n"; 2) that
Delaware's statute is "not as draconian" as those of some other states; and 3) tha t "federal takeover
regulation is likely to be worse." !d.
43. Se.e Carney, supra note 5, at 718 (describing unsuccessful attempts by Nevada and Maine to
compete with Delaware).
44. See Cary, supra note 9, at 665; Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 488; see generally Keith Paul
Bishop , Tlu Delaware oftlu WesL- Does Nevada Qffer Better Trwlmenlfor Direclms', 7 No.3 INSIGHTS 20 (1993)
(describi ng Nevada's efforts to compete with Delaware in attracting corporate charters).
45. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 488 (explaining that Nevada ado pted both Delaware
statutory and common law applying to corporations); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp.
1342, 1346-47 (D. Nev. 1997) (rejecting ITT's argument to the contrary and explicitly fmding that Nevada
follows Delaware case law). Ser. also Kamar, supra note 5, at 1911 (describing Nevada's adoption of
Delaware law as "wholesale").
46. See, e.g., Hilton Hotels, 978 F. Supp. at 1347 (following Delaware law on the power relationship
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Nevada has not persuaded corporations to consider Nevada
incorporation as a viable alternative to the traditional choice between
their home state and Delaware. 47
These observations have led to a refinement of the academic models
of regulatory competition. Commentators have replaced the initial
attempts to defend Delaware's dominance on the basis of substantive
superiority by a broader range of explanations. Roberta Romano, for
example, has done extensive work explaining why Delaware, from a
transaction cost perspective, has an incentive to compete for corporate
charters and is able to maintain its existing advantage in the race. 48
Romano explains that, because Delaware is a small state and is heavily
dependent on the revenues it obtains from corporate franchise taxes, it
is able to commit to its regulatory structure in a way that is impossible
for states that lack similar financial incentives. 49 This vievvpoint is
shared by] onathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, who further explain the
selection ofDelaware as driven by interest group dynamics. 5° Under the
11acey & Miller model, Delaware competes by making its law attractive
to the lawyers who benefit from litigation conducted in Delaware. 51
This competition need not increase firm value; indeed it may lead to a
litigation intensive regulatory structure that sacrifices the interests of the
firm and its shareholders in favor of the interests of counsel.
Scholars have expanded on the transaction cost approach and
identified a variety of nonsubstantive explanations for Delaware's
success. Although a complete analysis of these explanations is beyond
the scope of this article, they include the responsiveness of the Delaware
legislature and its commitment to updating the Delaware statute, 52
Delaware's specialized and expert judiciary which provides both rapid
and high quality litigation decisions, 53 network externalities provided by
Delaware law, 5+ and herd behavior. 55

between corporate board and sharehold ers); Shoen v. Alv!ERCO, 885 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (D. Nev. 1994)
(followin g Delaware precedent with resp ec t to judicial review of directors' interference with shareholder
voting power).
4 7. Su K a mar, supra no te 5, at 1911.
4-8. See R omano, supra note 5; Romano, supra note 15.
49. See R omano, supra note 15 , at 37-42.
50. See Macey & Miller, supra note 5.
51. See id. at 4 70 (explaining that "the rules that Delaware supplies often can be viewed as attempts
to maximize revenues to th e bar, and more particularly to an elite cadre of Wilmington la"ye rs who
pract ice corporate la w in the sta te").
52. See, e.g., Kaouris, supra note 1, at 973 (desc ribing res ponsiveness of Delaware legislature to
corp orate needs).
53. See infra notes 112-121.
54. See supra note 14.
55. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 37, at 703 (explaining that "[c]orporations may prefer to locate in a
popular jurisdiction of incorporation for reasons that are simply based on its popularity, not the inherent
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Whatever the source of Delaware's advantage, firms pay for the
privilege ofDelaware incorporation. The largest firms pay $150,000 a
year for the privilege of incorporating in Delaware. 56 Although this
amount may seem small relative to the operations of a large public
corporation, it is five hundred to one thousand times the amount those
firms would pay to incorporate elsewhere. 57 Troubled by the evidence
that Delaware can persistently charge what appears to be a
noncompetitive price for the privilege ofincorporation, scholars persist
in an effort to explain how Delaware incorporation adds value. In terms
of transaction costs, the choice of Delaware can be explained if
Delaware incorporation reduces the costs ofbusiness operations. The
benefits of Delaware incorporation may include such nonsubstantive
advantages as better courts or more readily available case law. So long
as the benefits outweigh the slightly higher cost of Delaware
incorporation, firms will continue to choose Delaware.
The problem with many of the nonsubstantive explanations for
Delaware's success is the inability of scholars to tie Delaware's supposed
advantages to predictable cost savings for Delaware firms. For example,
although a competent and expert judiciary might reduce the cost of
litigation, 58 Delaware law seems to create an increased risk oflitigation
for Delaware firms. 59 The combination of reduced litigation costs but
increased incidence oflitigation is likely to have an indeterminate effect
on firm value. 60 Scholars also attribute Delaware's success to network
externalities, which reduce information and compliance costs. 61 Yet
there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that Delaware firms incur

supe riority of its law"); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, PathDeperuknce in COTpom.U Contracting: Increasing
Returns, Herd Befuwiar and Cognitive Binses, 74 WASH. U. L.Q 347, 353 (1996) (considering the role of herd
behavior by corporate lawyc~).
56. See J1.1pra note 1 1.
57. See Kahan & Kamar, rupm note 12 (describing franchise tax structures in other states); see alro
Cyril Moscow, iviichigan or Del.m.ctue Incorporation, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1897, 1902 n.18 ( 1996) (quoting proxy
statement o f Devon Energy Corp. which claimed that the major factor behind decision to reincorpo rate
in Oklahoma was elimination of the annual Sl50,000 franchise tax associated with Delaware
incorporation).
58. A.n expert judiciary might, of course, produce better litigation outcomes as well. To the extent
that bencr outcomes arc the result of less judicial error, they can be included in the cost of litigation. To
th e ex tent they result from superior judgc.madc law, the better outcomes arc another aspect of the structure
o f Delaware lawmaking analyzed in Pan II, infra.
59. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 12, at 50 (arguing that Delaware law increases the level of
litiga tion for Delaware firms); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bllllkruptq Judges and Bllllkruptcy Vmue: Some Tlwughts on
Delaware, I DEL. L. REV. I, 23 (1998) (describing Delaware corporate law as litigation intensive).
60. But see Carney, rupra note 5, at 727 (arguing that Delaware law makes litigation more costly for
businesses than litigation elsewhere, to the benefit of Delaware lawyers).
61. See rupra note 14.
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lower legal costs. 52 Indeed, the limited scholarship on this issue suggests
that interest groups such as Delaware corporate lawyers have market
power of their own and are able to extract additional fees from firms
that incorporate in the state. 63 In addition, the increased legal costs
associated with out-of-state incorporation have been cited as a downside
to Delaware incorporation. 64 Moreover, a reduction in attorneys' fees,
like the more general reduction in legal costs, would have to be weighed
against the greater risk of litigation associated with Delaware
incorporation.
Delaware's body of decisional law provides a more general
transaction cost explanation for Delaware's success. Commentators
argue that, because of the substantial volume ofbusiness litigation in the
state, Delaware has built up a store of precedent that serves as an
independent and valuable resource for firms subject to Delaware law. 65
Thus Romano explains that Delaware's "well-developed case law with
a pool of handy precedent" makes Delaware decisions "more
predictable than those of other states." 66 Mel Eisenberg describes
Delaware's rich case law as increasing predictability. 57
Extensive and predictable case law reduces the cost of business
operations in two ways. A well developed body of precedent makes it
cheaper and easier to ascertain the legal consequences associated with
business decisions, thereby reducing the information cost of structuring
transactions. In addition, clear legal rules reduce the risk of subsequent
litigation. Notably, these benefits are independent of the substantive
merits of the applicable legal rules. Commentators have observed that,
with respect to business transactions, it is often more important that the
applicable legal rules be settled than that they be settled correctly. 58 As

62. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, ugal lmplicalions ofNetwork Economic Effects, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 479, 5 77 (1998) (questioning extent to which network extcrnalitie5 can be expected to reduce the
cost of legal services) .
63. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 5 , at 472; Kamar & Kahan, supra note 12, at 54.
64. See, e.g., Charles W . Murdock, ~Wzy Illinois? A Comparison of Illinois and Delaware Corporate
JurisjJrurknce, 19 S. Iu. U. LJ. 1, 4-6 (1994) (describing the extra costs for an Illinois business to incorporate
in Delaware).
65. See, e.g., Comment, Lawfor Sale: A Study ofthe Delaware Corporalion Law qf 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
861, 894 (1969) (offering as the reason for Delaware's dominance: "the large body of p recedent th a t has
been built up since 1899-lawycrs know what they arc getting into").
66. Romano, supra note 5, at 277.
67. See Melvin Aron Eise nberg, The Structure tfCorporatinn Law, 89 COLliM. L. REV. 1461 , 1508
(1989).
68. See, e.g. , Evan H. Caminkcr, 11'7zy lv!u.st lnfmor Courts Obry Supmor Court Precedents~, 46 STAN. L.
REv . 817,872 (1994), Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 5 71, 598 (1987) (citing predictability
as more important than optimality in contract and real estate transactions); Avery Katz, The Strakgic
Structure of Offer and AccejJI.ance: Game Thory and the Law of Contract Flrnnalwn, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 218
(1990) (common approach to the rules of offer and acceptance in contract law is that "it is more important
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a consequence, the predictability and stability provided by Delaware's
extensive body of precedent are described as one of the affirmative
advantages ofDelaware incorporation. 69
Upon closer examination, however, Delaware law is revealed not as
predictable, but rather as surprisingly indeterminate. A number of
factors contribute to this indeterminacy. D elaware's corpo rate law rules
are standards based, Delaware precedents are narrow and fact-specific,
and Delaware courts employ weak principles of stare decisis leading to
extensive doctrinal flux. It is difficult to reconcile this reality of
Delaware law with the received economic wisdom that stable and
predictable legal rules are optimal. 70 As a result, Ehud Kamar and
.lviarcel Kahan raise questions about the efficiency of Delaware law,
suggesting that the indeterminacy of Delaware law may be valuereducing.71 Moreover, Kamar argues that Delaware effectively employs
indeterminacy to impede the ability of other states to compete with
Delaware for corporate charters. 72 Thus indeterminacy increases
Delaware's market power. These conclusions create a puzzle for Kamar
and Kahan. IfDelaware law is suboptimal, is Delaware's market power
merely the result of anticompetitive behavior? Is Delaware a successful
monopolist that has taken advantage of imperfections in the market for
corporate law?
This article suggests another answer. In the following section, the
articl e explores in greater detail the manner in which Delaware
produces corporate law. The article demonstrates that Delaware
employs an atypical lawmaking process . A substantial portion of
Delaware's corporate law is made by the courts, but the Delaware courts
make law in a manner traditionally associated with legislative rather
than judicial lawmaking. The following section of the article explores
the normative implications of this process.

for the law to be se ttled than to be settled correctly"); sec also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 406 (1932) (adhering to precedent "is usuall y the wise policy, because in most matters it is mo re
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right"').
69 . See, e.g., Kaouris, supra note I , at 1011; Masse y, supra note 17, at 702-3 (sta ting that "there is
widespread agreement that o ne important reaso n [that more large corpor~Hi ons in co r·porate in Delaware
than any o ther state] is that Delaware otTers a more certain and predictable body o f law").
70. See, e.g. ,John C. Coates, IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rul.t '![Corporal~ Law: lvfinori!JI .Discounts in
Conjlicl Transaclwns , 14 7 U . PA. L. REV. 1251 , 1256 (1999) (" Ideal rule s of corpora te law should be
consistent.").
71. See Kahan & K amar, supra note 12, at 67 (concluding that "it is likely that Delaware law is more
litigation-in tensive than is op timal").
72. See Kamar , supra note 5. Kamar does not argue that Delaware's use of indeterminacy is
purposeful.
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II. THE DELAWARE COURTS AS LAWMAKERS
A. The Traditional Lawmal.,'ing Role rf the Courts
In other projects, I have analyzed the lawmaking role of the courts
and some of the structural differences between judicial and legislative
lawmaking.73 I have developed what might be described as a model of
traditional judicial lawmaking. I argue that traditional judicial
lawmaking is generally evolutionary in nature. 74 More specifically,
judicial lawmaking is characterized by incremental legal change within
the framework of a fixed set of objectives. 75 Unlike legislatures, courts
rarely change legal rules as a result of a shift in political power or a
rejection of the policies that motivated the adoption of the original rule,
preferring to leave those decisions for the legislative process.
Courts are also limited in the scope of the legal change that they can
effect due to limitations on control of their agendas. 76 Courts, unlike
legislatures, generally cannot initiate legal change but must wait for
litigants to commence an action. 77 Courts may also, in some
circumstances, be constrained by requirements such as justiciability as
to the issues that they can reach. 78 As a consequence of these
limitations, adjudicative legal change is more predictable, coherent and,
frequently, smaller in magnitude than legislative change.
These characteristics are enhanced by the doctrine of stare decisis
which operates to limit the circumstances under which a court may
deviate from a previously adopted legal rule. In another pending
project, I explain how stare decisis enhances the stability of judicial
lawmaking. 79 While a legislature requires no justification to overturn a
previously adopted statute or reject a policy objective embraced by its
predecessor, a court's disagreement with the wisdom of a previously
adopted legal rule is rarely sufficient to justify overruling. Instead, a
court that wishes to overturn a precedent must generally demonstrate
that the prior legal rule suffers from some sort of substantive or

73. Set Fisch, supra note 23; Jill E. Fisch, A Theory '![Stare Du:isis (working paper, 2000) (o n fil e with
author).
74. Su Fisch, supra note 23, at II 07-8.
75. Said.
76. Ste general!;; Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Coruirtmcy: On Equality, lnugrity, andJustice in Stare Decisis,
I 05 YALE LJ. 203 1, 2081-83 ( 1996) (describing dilferences in relative power of courts and legis latu res as
lawmakers).
77. Su NEIL K. KO~IESAR, !~!PERFECT ALTERNATIVES 125 (1994).
78. Set, e.g., RlCHARD H. FALLON, ET AL., HART MTI WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 123-293 (4th ed. 1996) (exploring various justiciability doctrines such as stand ing,
ripeness, and so forth, that limit the lawmaking power of the federal courts).
79. Su Fisch, supra note 73.
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procedural defect. 80 .AJthough a court may seek to escape the
consequences of a contrary precedent by distinguishing it, that very act
narrows the scope of the court's decision. This distinction between the
legislative and judicial processes permits the government to choose
greater legal stability by committing particular subject matter to the
courts. Thus the doctrine of stare decisis fosters stable legal rules and
privileges courts over legislators as creators ofthose rules. 81
Finally, the temporal scope of judicial lawmaking reinforces the
traditional judicial role. Judge-made rule changes typically apply
retroactively. 82 This operation can be justified on both fairness and
efficiency grounds because of the nature of judicial lawmaking. 83 A
variety of doctrinal constraints limit the ability of courts to apply new
legal rul es in a purely prospective manner. In the federal co urts, for
example, prospective adjudication may run afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause or the constitutional ban on advisory opinions. 84
Forward-looking aspects ofjudicial opinions may also be characterized
as dicta, a characterization that allows subsequent courts to disregard
such statements as authoritative rulemaking. 85 These constraints
effectively limit the extent to which judicial rulemaking can focus on the
regulation of future transactions.
These characteristics of traditional judicial lawmaking increase the
stability and predictability of judge-made law relative to legislation. I
argue elsewhere that these features may explain the dominance of
common law rules in areas such as property and contract law, where
stability and predictability are said to reduce transaction costs and
facilitate transactions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified the
primacy of stability and predictability in these areas as a basis for
applying principles that restrain judicial lawmaking to this traditional
mode, such as requiring courts to adhere closely to precedent. 85

80. See Ui.
8l. See Ui.
82. See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298,311-12 (1994) ('"The principle that
statutes operate only prospe ctively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is famili a r to evc1y law
student."') (q uoting United States v. Sec . Indu s. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982)).
83. See Fisch, supra note 23, at I 1 I 0.
84. See, e.g. , id. at 1061 (discussing Supreme Court decisions o n adjudicative prospectivity); james
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (199 1) (rejecting selective adjudicative prospectivity on
th e grounds that it was imperm issible to apply difTerentlegal rules to similarly situated litigants).

85. See, e.g. , Michael C. Dorf, DU:ta !Uld Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2001 (1994)
(distinguishing between holdings and dicta and tracing concern over the legitim acy of federal court dicta
to the case o r controversy requirement of Article III).
86. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 50 1 U.S. 808,828 (1991) ("Considerations in favor of stare deci.ri.s
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract right~, where reliance interests are involved . .. ").
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of Delaware law

Although Delaware's role in the competition for corporate charters
is frequently analyzed in terms ofDelaware's corporation statute,judgemade law is at least as, if not more, significant. Despite their statutory
source, the majority ofDelaware's important legal rules are the result of
judicial decisions. The scope of the business judgment rule, the analysis
of transactions that implicate the duty of loyalty, the legal standards
governing management's response to a hostile tender offer, all are based
on legal principles articulated by the Delaware courts. Lawyers tend to
think of corporate law as statutory, but there is a substantial common
law component to Delaware corporate law.
From a transactional perspective, the importance of decisional law
increases. Although the D elaware statute provides general guidelines
about corporate formalities such as the scheduling of annual meetings 87
and the required components of a corporate charter, 88 the statute does
not deal with the fiduciary principles that provide the foundation of
corporate law and allow, under appropriate circumstances, judicial
scrutiny of corporate decisionmaking. As a practical matter, the
interpretation and application of these fiduciary principles is the heart
of corporate law, yet the Delaware statute provides almost no guidance
on the subject. Apart from the provision that relates to interested
director transactions, 89 the Delaware statute does not even address the
subject of fiduciary duties.
Moreover, Delaware corporate law relies on judicial lawmaking to a
greater extent than other states. Other state statutes, for example, define
the standard of care applicable to corporate directors; 90 the Delaware
statute does not. 91 Although Delaware decisions authorize directors to

87. See DEL. CODE.\J'-li'i. tit. 8, § 2 11 (1991) (requirements regarding annual shareholder meeting).
Indeed, even with respect to these types of issu es, literal complia nce with th e statutory requirement.s may
not save a transaction from judicial sc rutin y. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 43 7, 439
(Del. 1971 ) (the court rej ected advancement of the date of an annual meeting, in co mpliance with the
relevant statute, ho lding that "inequitable action docs not become permissible simply beca use it is legally
possible .").
88. See DEL. CODE A."\N. tit. 8, § 102 (1991) (specifying required contents o f certificate of
incorporation).
89. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § !44 (1991).
90. See E. No rman Veasey &Julie M.S. Seitz, 77u BUSJness ]udgmr:111 Rule in th.e Revised M otkl Act, th.e
Trans Union Case, and tJze A.lJ Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TE..'(. L. REV. 1483, 1493 (1985) (stating that a
number of states have codified the duty of care); see, e.g., VA. COD I:: ANN. § 13.1-690A. (Michie 1985)
(defin ing director's duty o f care in terms o f "his good faith business judgme nt of the best interest of the
corporation"); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.30 (1984) (add ressin g standards of conduct for Directors);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 717 (McKinney Supp. 1999) (adopting statutory standard of care).
91. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 44, at 2l (explaining that Nevada has codified the standard of care
applicable to directors, but Delaware has not).
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consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, 92 Delaware has
no "other constituency" statute. 93 Other states have codified the
business judgment rule; 94 Delaware has left development of the rule to
common law. 95 Georgia has a statutory provision addressed to the
corporate opportunity doctrine; 96 Delaware relies on precedent. 97 Even
the circumstances under which a demand is excused in a shareholder
derivative suit are addressed in Delaware by judge-made chancery court
rules rather than by statute .98
The lawmaking by Delaware courts is also distinctive. As noted
above, Delaware decisional law is relatively indeterminate. 99 Delaware's
judicial lawmaking also has a number of atypical characteristics that
cause it to resemble the legislative process. Despite the similarities,
Delaware courts do not face the political pressures associated with
legislative lawmaking; indeed, for state courts, the Delaware courts
enjoy a high degree of political independence.
Recent scholarship has highlighted the indeterminacy of Delaware
law. 100 As Ehud Kamar shows, Delaware cases have adopted a largely

92. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro leum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
93. Su Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical FramruJorkfor Enforr:ing Corpora!L Constitumry
Statutes, 70 TE..'i:. L. REV. 579 (1992) (describing other constituency statutes and states that have adopted
suc h statutes); John A. MacKerron, Variery of Choice in the Corporate Law "Menus" of the Great Laks Slatts, 71
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 469,486-87 (1994) (describing othe r co nstituency statutes in laws of Great Lakes
states and obse!>'ing that Delaware has no such provision).
94. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.3 1 (1984) (adopting standards of liability for
directors); Julie Gwyn Hudson, The Exclusivity '![the Appraisal Rmzer!J Under theN= Norllz Carolina Business
Corpomtion AcL· Deciding the Standard if ReviruJfor Cash-Out Mergers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 501, 537 n.248 (199 1)
(exp laining that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 ( 1990) codifies th e business judgment rule).
95. See Veasey & Seitz, sujJTa note 90, at 1505 (stating that Delaware docs not have a statute on the
business judgment rule).
96. See GA. CODEA'\N. § 14-2-87\ (a)( ! )(C) (1994) (auth o rizing an action against corporate officers
or directors for the appropriation of any business opportunity of the corporation).
97. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939) (d eve lo ping Delaware common law corporate
opportunity doctrine).
98. Set DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (addressing demand requiremen t); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I 0, § 361
(1999) (authorizing chancellor to adopt rules of chancery court). Compare N.Y. Bt.:s. CORP. LAw§ 626(c)
(McKinney 1999) (statutorily specifying when demand is required); Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 198
(N.Y. 1996) (concluding that changing the scope of demand requirement was properly a subject for the
legislature not the court).
99. Some commentators go further and characterize substantive areas of Delaware law as
incoherent. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 70, at 1287 (describing "current Delaware rules on minority
discounts [as] incoherent, unpredictable, and inconsistent with the appraisal statute") .
l 00. The discussion here focuses on the indeterminac y o f Delaware's liability rules. The nature of
corporate law creates highly indeterminate remedial law as wtll. For example , difTiculties in valuatio n make
it difficult to predict the result of a judicial de termination to award fair pri ce or fair value. See general[y
Ruthcford B. Campbcll,Jr., Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 N. CAR. L. REV. 101, 105
(1999) (describi ng absence of underlying principles in valuation determinations and resulting lack of
consistency and predictability in case outcomes). This ambiguity is both inherent in business law and not
uniqu e to Delaware.
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standard-based approach. 101 Kamar focuses on cases dealing with
fiduciary duties and demonstrates that fact-intensive legal standards
dominate the case law. Legal tests that turn on the proportionality of
management's response to a perceived threat, that assess the legitimacy
of a self-dealing transaction based on whether it meets a test of " entire
fairness," and that use reasonableness as a benchmark for evaluating
business decisionmaking are standard based. Standards apply general
principles that judges must use to evaluate transactions from an ex post
perspective . Louis Kaplow explains that standards, in comparison to
rules, increase judicial discretion. 102 This discretion, in turn, reduces the
ability of decisionmakers to predict the legal consequences of their
actions ex ante.
Del aware courts also apply the relevant legal standards in a fact and
case specific manner. As a result, one court's determination that a
particular course of dealing was reasonable under the relevant legal test
provides little guidance to corporate actors about subsequent d ecisions
applying the same legal test. One of the best known illustrations of this
problem is the takeover cases. Some commentators 103 have struggled to
formulate a theory ofDelaware takeover doctrine that permits them to
reconcile cases such as Paramount Communications, Inc. u. Time, Inc. 104 and
Paramount Commuications, Inc. u. QVC Network, Inc .. 105 Such a reconciliation
is extremely difficult, however, and leaves the courts open to the charge
that their decisions are random or arbitrary. 106 Although the outcomes
in these decisions can be explained instead on the basis of factual
differences, this analysis can only be performed on an ex post basis. 107
As a result, the decisions offer little insight to those who seek predictive
power from doctrinal analysis.
Kamar's observations about Delaware law admittedly are true, to
some extent, about corporate law in other states. Indeed, many states
choose to follow Delaware decisionallaw. 108 Nonetheless, to the extent

I 0 I. See K.am a r, supra note 5.
I 02. See Louis Kaplow, Rules VerS11S Standards: An Economic Ana[ysis, 42 D UKE LJ. 55 7 ( 1992).
I 03. See, e.g., Marcel K a ha n, Paramount or Parrulox: TJu Delaware Supreme Court 's Takover ]uri.rprudence,
19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994) (a rguing that Delaware's takeO\'er jurisprudence is based on th e scope of
authority allocated to directo rs).
I 04. S7l A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
105. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
I 06. See, e.g., David A. Skeei,Jr. TJu Unanimity Norm inDelmvnre Corpom.l.e Law, 83 VA. L. REv. 127, 166
(1997) (" From a doctrin a l pe rspec tive, Trme -Warner [5 71 A.2d at 1140J and QVC arc extremely difficult to
reconcile.").
107 . See, e.g., Kamar,
note 5, at 1918 (explaining th a t the "key" to reconciling Tim e and QVC
is "a close reading of factual nuances").
I 08. See, e.g., Alva, supra note 16, at 903 n.92 (describing frequency with whi ch prominent D ela ware

supra

decisions have been cited by other courts).
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that legal standards diverge, the principles adopted by Delaware courts
retain the greatest degree of ambiguity. For example, under Delaware
law, a court faced with a motion by a special litigation committee to
dismiss a derivative suit may, in addition to considering the degree to
which the committee was informed and independent, also evaluate
whether, in the court's independent business judgment, dismissal is
appropriate. 109 The New York courts have rejected the second
component of this test, significantly reducing the degree of judicial
discretion. 110 Similarly, Delaware's controversial intermediate standard
of review in the takeover context is not universally accepted as the
appropriate test for evaluating the directors' conduct. 111
Delaware decisional law is also characterized by a high degree of
flexibility and responsiveness. Not only are Delaware courts active
lawmakers, they are willing to revise previously announced legal
doctrines on the theory that a different approach reflects sounder policy.
In part, the flexibility ofDelaware case law results from the structure of
the Delaware courts. The Delaware chancery courts, which are the trial
level courts on corporate issues, are courts of equity. 112 Delaware
adheres closely to traditional English principles of equity 113 and is one
of only three states to retain the equity /law distinction. 114 The nature
of equity jurisprudence contributes to the flexibility in Delaware
corporate law 115 and, because chancery courts sit without a jury, they
are able to resolve corporate issues rapidly. 116 Delaware courts are also
known for their ability to respond to business litigation quickly through,
for example, granting expedited hearings and providing a rapid
.
..
117
turnaroun d tlme
on d ec1s1ons.
The Delaware chancery courts are also specialized courts. 118
Approximately three quarters of the cases pending before the chancery

l 09. See Zapata C o rp . v. Maldo nado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981 ).
II 0. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979)
Ill . See, e.g. , OHI O REV. COD I:: ANN. § I 70 1.59(C) (Banks-Baldwin 1993) (rejection of Unocal and
cod ifi cati o n o f existing common law).
112. See Alva, supra note 16, at 903.
113. Sa William T. Quillen & Michael H a nrahan, A Slum Histmy ufth.e IX/awure Cuurt ofChuncery1792· 1992, 18 DEL.j. CORP. L. 819, 840 (1993) (explaining that "the C o urt of Cha ncery of the State of
D e laware, has adhered more cl osely to the English Court of Chancery and to English precedents, than
th ose of any o f her sister States") (foo tnote omitted).
114. See Alva, supra no te 16, at 903.
115 . See, e.,~., Kamar, supm no te 5, at 1943 (describing how Delawa re courts remain faithful ro
trad ition a., co urts of equity); Massey, supra note 17, at 703 (describing how equity jurisdiction contributes
to ncxibility a nd responsiveness of Delaware decisional law).
11 6. See DEL. CO NST. art. IV, § 10 (providing that the Chancel)' co urt sits without a jury); Massey,
JUpm note 17, a t 704 (explaining th a t absence of a jury enables the court to act more quickly).
ll7. See Massey, rupra note 17 , at 704.
118. Seeid.at705.
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court are corporate. 119 Delaware chancery judges are known for their
expertise in business matters, and the court has developed a reputation
for its sophistication in corporate law. 120 As a result, chancery court
opinions are widely quoted, and the legal standards announced by the
chancery courts are widely taken to reflect the current state ofDelaware
law.l21
The fact that a specialized trial court is, in Delaware, the primary
judicial lawmaker, increases the degree of flexibility in Delaware
corporate law. The decision of one chancery court does not bind
another, and chancery court decisions are readily overturned by the
Delaware Supreme Court even when they appear to have developed
workable or predictable legal standards. Thus, as a practical matter,
Delaware case law is based on a large number of de cisions that have
little stare decisis effect.
Although decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court are, of course,
binding on the chancery court, the supreme court also appears ready to
distinguish or overrule a precedent without regard to considerations of
stare decisis. The absence of attention to stare decisis is partially a
consequence of the fact-intensive nature of the court's decisions; the
court can easily deny that it is overruling a precedent by using case
specific facts to distinguish its prior holding. 122 Similarly the court can
narrow the precedential effect of its decisions by framing its holdings
narrowly and tying those holdings to specific facts. Yet even when the
court overrules itself, it does so seemingly unconstrained by the
considerations of stare decisis that commonly limit overruling. For
example, when the court explicitly overturned several of its own
precedents in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 123 the opinion made no reference
to the doctrine of stare decisis. Instead, the court operates on the basis
that it, like a legislature, can rewrite its prior doctrine based solely on a
reassessment of the relevant policy considerations.
The unanimity norm of the Delaware Supreme Court further
distinguishes the Delaware judiciary from that of other state courts.
David Skeel explains that the norm also contributes to the instability of
Delaware legal doctrine. As Skeel has observed, the Delaware Supreme

119. See Alva, supra not<: 16, at 903 .
120. Delaware courts also enj oy a greater degree of political ind::pendencc th an that o f many state
courts. See infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g. , William H. Rehnquist, Th Promimrzce ojtk Deu1ware Cuurt ojCiumcery in. tk Stau-Fedeml
Join£ Venlure of Prwiding]uslice, 48 Bus. Ltw. 351 (1992).
122. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Conslraimd by Preceden!, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 19-22 (1989) (desc ribing
the argument that a court which distinguishes a precedent by narrowing the previously announced rule to
th e facts of the prior case is, in effect, unco nstrained by the precedent).
123. 45 7 A.2d 70 I (Del 1983).
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Court has an unusual tendency to issue unanimous decisions. 124 Skeel
explains that the unanimity norm destabilizes Delaware law by masking
the degree to which varying judicial preferences may lead to cycling
from one doctrinal approach to another. Skeel demonstrates how the
varying preferences of individual justices as to the appropriate legal
approach in takeover cases may explain the doctrinal shift from TimeWarner to QVC. 125 In addition to departing from the decisionmaking
process used by other states, the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision making process, in which a single result masks conflicting or
cycling lawmaking principles that are likely to animate future results,
more closely resembles legislative decisionmaking.
Delaware judges also control their lawmaking agenda to an unusual
degree. 126 Chris Peters explains that, as a general principle, judges
cannot generally choose the legal issues that they wish to decide, but
rather must wait for the appropriate case to present itself. 127 Legal rules
announced by a court that are unnecessary to the result in a given case
are disparagingly characterized as dicta. 128 Similarly, courts are
constrained as to the temporal scope of their lawmaking. Recent
Supreme Court precedent finds constitutional support for the principle
that judicial lawmaking should be retroactive, and that it is improper for
a court to announce a legal rule in a case and then fail to apply that
legal rule to the parties before it. 129
Delaware courts seem unconstrained by these principles. They have
repeatedly announced legal principles solely to guide future business
decisionmaking. 130 Ron Gilson explains Chancellor Allen's practice of
providing doctrinal guidance for future transactions through dicta. 131
Despite upholding the structure of a transaction or the decision of the
board, Allen went out of his way on a number of occasions to point out

124. See Skeel, supra note I 06. Skeel points to a number of factors that contribute to the unanimity
norm, including an unusual Supreme Court rule that provides for an automatic en bane hearing in any case
in which a justice dissents from a panel decision.
125. See i.d. at 166
126. Indeed, Delaware recently amended its Constitution to permit the Delaware Supreme Court
to answer questions certified to it by other State Supreme Courts. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8)
(granting Supreme Court jurisdiction to determine questions oflaw certified to it by the highest appellate
court of any other state). Most states only accept certified questions from federal court.>. See Geri J.
Yonovcr, A Kinder, Genlla Ene: Rdning In tlzt Use ofCertifoation, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 305, 314 (1994) (describing
state certifiGl.tion rules as of 1988).
127. See Peters, supra note 76, at 2048.
128. See generally Dorf, supra note 85 (describing legal significance of characterizing reasoning as dicta).
129. See Fisch, supra note 23, at l 060-63 (analyzing decisions requiring retroactive adjudication).
130. Doug Branson terms these announcements "roadmaps." See Branson, supra note 20, at 104-05.
13!. See Ronald]. Gilson, The Fine Art of]udgi.ng: Wzlliam T. Allm, 22 DEL.j. CORP. L. 914, 917-18
(1997).
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weaknesses or deficiencies that should be remedied. 132 A notable
example is the Caremark decision 133 in which Chancellor Allen provided
a comprehensive description of the duties of corporate directors 134 in the
context of approving a settlement and despite concluding, at the outset
of the opinion, that "there is a very low probability ... that the directors
ofCaremark breached any duty to appropriately monitor and supervise
the enterprise." 135 The fact that the description was dicta did not seem
to affect its importance as an addition to Delaware law. The principles
announced in Caremark have been among the most frequently cited by
subsequent courts and commentators. 136
Delaware courts have also reached out to apply newly announced
doctrines to cases seemingly outside the courts' reach . For example,
concerned that stockholders would not anticipate its new rules
governing appraisal rights and take the necessary steps to preserve their
rights, the court in Weinberger announc ed that it would permit
stockholders in a variety of ongoing transactions and lawsuits to
retroactively claim the benefits of the new rule. 137 This decision was in
clear contravention of the statutory limitations on the assertion of
appraisal rights. The supreme court's action in vVeinberger was a
departure from the lawmaking norm that judges lack the freedom to
adjust the timing with which their newly announced legal rules take
effect in order to reflect policy considerations. 138
In conclusion, Delaware courts are not structured like typical state
courts and do not restrict themselves to traditional judicial lawmaking.
Instead, Delaware courts aggressively adopt and modify corporate law
doctrine, exhibiting a degree of activism that more closely resembles the
legislative process. This resemblance is enhanced by the nature of

l32. Gilson cites this practice with approval.
Such self-conscious a tlention to influencing the conduct o ffuturc tran sact ions, ind epe nd ent
o f the case before the court, gives special meaning to the phrase "mere di cta." In the fast
moving environment into which events thrust th e Court of Chancery, traditional common
law accretion of precedent was too slow to help. The Chancellor's instrumcmal use of dic ta ,
directed exp licitly at transac tion planners, was a creati,·e a nd elegant response to the
problem o f ke eping the law moving at a pace at least close to that of th e market.
Id. Z~t91 7 -1 8 .

See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Deri va ti ve Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
See id. at 966-70.
Irl at 961.
See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Govenumce: 77ze B(lard of Directors and Internal Control, 19
Ci\RDOZO L. REV. 23 7, 261 (1997) (desc ribing Chancellor Allen's statements in Caremark as the "mo st
comprehensive and authoritative statement on the current status of (the board's mo nitoring obligation]").
!37. See Weinberger v. UPO, Inc. , 457 A.2d 701, 714-15 (appl yin g its remedy to pending and
proposed mergers in which prospective plaintiffs might have already lost the right to pursue an appraisal).
138. See Fisch, supra note 23, at 1119 (discussing Weinberger approach as a way o f providing courts with
greater temporal flexibility).
133.
13 4.
135.
!3 6.
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D elaware decisional law, which, although largely indetermin ate and
standard based, appears to be driven by policy considerations, including
an effort to respond on an ongoing basis to developments in the business
world. In short, Delaware judicial lawmaking may seem more closely
ti ed to legislation. Nonetheless, as the next secti on will expl ain, the
Delaware courts should not be seen as part of the p olitical process.
Inde ed , D elaware judges enjoy a number of compara tive advantages
over state legislators as corporate lawm ake rs.

III.

THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF DEL\WA.R.E 'S LA.\v'?vfAIZING
PROCESS

Thus far, this article has characterized Delaware judicial lawmaking
as unusu al. Does this unusual lawmaking matter? In pa rticular, of what
relevance is Delaware's lawmaking process to the debate ove r regulatory
competition? In this sec tion, this article evaluates the normative
consequences ofDelaware's lawmaking. The article considers whether
D elaware's approach to corporate lawmaking is likely to increase firm
value, th ereby offering an efficiency-based explanation for D elaware 's
ability to attract corporations. Alternatively, Delaware's lawmaking
structure may, as suggested by Kamar, simply be a mechanism by which
Delaware can maintain its position and increase its market power.
This article concludes that Delaware's unusual lawmaking structure
enhances firm value and perhaps explains the widespread preference for
Delaware incorporation. Delaware's lawmaking process is valuable in
three ways. First, Delaware's indeterminate corporate law may have
benefits as well as costs . Indeterminacy induces nego tiation and
removes some incentives for strategic behavior. Indeterminate law also
gives the courts greater flexibility. Second, D elaware's lawmaking is
uniquely structured to maximize responsive ness to changing business
developm ents. Finally by vesting a high degree oflegislative lawmaking
power in a decisionmaker that is largely insulated from political
pressure, Delaware reduces the potential for rent-seeking in connection
with the lawmaking process.
A. 17ze Valu e qf Indete7minacy
Traditional analysis favors clear legal rules both because cl ear rules
reduce information and litigation costs and because clear rules are
viewed as more likely to induce primary behavior in compliance with
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those rules. 139 A legal system that relies on standards and muddy rules 140
increases uncertainty which, in turn, increases transaction costs.
Accordingly, traditional analysis suggests that business is more efficiently
conducted under a clear rule based system.
Obviously this argument is overstated. A standard based approach
can provide more realistic treatment of particularized facts. In cases in
which factual distinctions are important, a rule based approach is likely
to be unworkable. 141 A broadly written rule will prove overinclusive and
discourage valuable transactions; a narrowly written rule will be
underinclusive and easy to avoid through careful planning. For
example, if one takes the view that management resistance to a hostile
tender offer is sometimes desirable, it would be legislatively difficult to
specify the circumstances under which such resistance is permissible. A
muddy "reasonableness" standard reduces the difficulty of specification
while preventing opportunism.
Standards thus increase lawmaking efficiency in two ways. Standards
permit the lawmaker to tailor the result in a case and to thereby avoid
the hardship or unfairness associated with application of a crystalline
rule without destroying the applicable doctrinal structure. 142 Standards
also create an affirmative role for the courts as gapfillers. 143 In the
business context, the absence of a explicit prohibition may imply that a
transaction is unrestricted although, as a practical matter, it may be
impossible to predict and specifY the full range oflimitations on business
decisionmaking. Private business contracts are similarly likely to contain
gaps due to changing or unanticipated circumstances or the practical
impossibility of complete specification. Standards allow the courts to fill

139. See, e.g., K.amar, supra note 5, at 1919 (describing importance oflegal determinacy to business
decisionmaking); see general!J'Jaso n Sco njo hnston , Unarllzin!J, ChaiJS, and tJu T IJT"ls Process: An EconomicAna{ysis
uf Legal Form , 76 C OR:'\E.U. L. RE.V. 34 1 (1991 ) (disc uss ing indeterminacy and th e rela tive impact or rules
versus standards on primary behavior).
140. The characte riza tion or indeterminate legal rul es as "muddy" originated with Carol Rose. See
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and lvfud in Proper!J Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 5 77 (1988). R ose d escribes muddy rules
as "fuzzy, ambiguous rules o f decision ." !d. at 578. Muddy rules and standards arc closely related concepts,
although, as Dan Burk explains, commentato rs gener..tlly choose their terminology based on the focus or
their analysis. See Dan L. Burk, Mudr{y Ruus for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 129 ( 1999). Rul es
a re described as muddy by co mmentators who are focu sing on the ind eterminacy of the rules.
Commentators emphasize a standards based approach when they arc foc using on the fl exibility that
standards provid e to decisionmakers. See id. Fo r purposes o f thi s article , the c hoice of termin o lo gy is
unimportant, Delaware de cis iona l law can accurately be described as bot h sta ndard based and muddy.
141. Indeed , even perfect rules are both under and ovcrinclusivc. See johnsto n, supra note 139, at
363.
142. See Rose, supra note 140, at 603-04.
143. See Ian Ayres, kfaking a Difference: The Conlr~utual Contributions ufE!1.Jterhrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1391 , 1404 ( 1992) (explaining how ex post gapfilling by courts can be more efficient than ex ante
specification of rules).
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these gaps through ex post determinations. As Ian Ayres has observed,
courts and the common law process are particularly well suited to this
role. 144
Muddy rules may have particular utility in the business context
because of their effect on the bargaining process. Ian Ayres and Eric
Talley characterize muddy rules as an example of divided entitlements,
in which each party has a probabilistic claim. 145 They then use game
theory to demonstrate that muddy rules may facilitate bargaining. First,
in the absence of the ability to predict a winner if the dispute results in
litigation, the parties may be more willing to negotiate. Second, muddy
rules can reduce the incentives to engage in strategic behavior by forcing
parties to reveal information during negotiations. 146
Rules that encourage negotiation instead of litigation are especially
valuable in corporate transactions, in which litigation costs can be large
and create a deadweight loss for shareholders and society. Although
D elaware law is often described as encouraging litigation, 147 a careful
examination reveals that many Delaware cases settle early in the
litigation process and that Delaware law both encourages and facilitates
settlement. 148 Indeed, it is possible to explain some of the muddiness of
Delaware case law as resulting from the procedural posture of the
relevant judicial proceedings. Cases in which a court is considering a
request for preliminary relief are apt to appear more indeterminate than
cases in which the litigants have developed a complete factual and legal
record. 149 Similarly, Delaware's pro-settlement orientation may cause
courts to announce legal rules in the context of approving a settlement.
The Caremark 150 decision is an example of this practice. Another
example is Kahn v. Sullivan, 151 in which the Delaware Supreme Court
announced the legal principles that determine when corporate

144. See Ui. at 1394 ("Common law co urt' arc the onlr institution th a t could possibly fill gaps better
th an the firm s themselves.").
145. Su Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomvnic Bargaining DivUiing a ugal Entitlement to FacilitaJe Corman

Trrzde, I 04 YALE LJ. I 027 (1995 ).
146. See also Jason Scottjohnston, Bargaining Under Rule.r Ver.ru.r Standarrls, II J.L. Eco~. & ORG. 256
(1995) (de mon strating thatco ntinge nt ex post entitlements may induce efficient bargaining bette r than clear
ex ante entitlements).
14 7. See sujlm notes 50-51 a nd accompanying text.
I +8. See, e.g., Carolyn Berger & Darla Pomeroy, Settlmtenl Fever, BUS. LAw TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1992,
at 7 (describing 2'/, year study o f settlement practices in D elaware Chancery court and finding that court
approved 96 o f98 p roffe red settlements and awarded an ave rage o f92% of the attorneys fees reque sted).
149 . See Gilson , Jujlra no te 131 , at 9 15 (describing how fa st-paced takeover market caused much
takeover litigation to be resol ved after a chancery co urt decision on a motion for a prelimin ary injun ction
and prior to appe llate review or trial on the merits).
!50. See In re Caremark lnl'l , Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch . 1996).
lSI. 594 A. 2d 48 (Del. 1991)
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philanthropy amounts to waste. 152 Although in reviewing a settlement,
th e court must consider the strength of the plaintiffs claims, the Kahn
court warned that its role was extremely limited. 153 This limited role
may result in rules that differ from those that would be announced in a
different procedural context.
:M uddy rules also enable courts to engage in ex post tailoring of the
legal structure to the particular factual context presented. The nature
of the litigation process provides courts with information that gives them
a comparative advantage over legislatures \Vith respect to this type of
tailoring. Although legislatures may be better suited than courts at
gathering information ex ante, they are less likely to see the ex post
consequences of their chosen rules. Corporate law, in particular,
because of th e essentially unlimited range of structural possibilities, may
make ex ante specification difficult. Corporate lawmakers may be
unable to determine the appropriate legal standards until they see a
range of factual scenarios. 154 Muddy rules provide courts with the
flexibility to respond to these scenerios.
The foregoing analysis does not mean that indeterminate corporate
law is an unqualified good, merely that indeterminacy has benefits as
well as the costs that have been identified by Kamar and others. 155
vVhether these benefits exceed the costs of indeterminacy to Delaware
firms is an empirical question.
T he costs ofindeterminacy may, however, be overstated. 156 Although
indeterminacy increases the risk of liability, the penalties for corporate
decisionmakers who guess wrong are particularly limited. To the extent
that legal rules arc; indeterminate, corporate officers and directors are
able to engage in a broader range of conduct without acting in bad faith.
So long as they act in good faith, corporate decisionmakers are unlikely
to fa ce personal liability for their decisions. Indeed, good faith is
typically the key to insuring their protection under statutory and charter
limitations on personal liabiliti 57 and corporate indemnification

!52. See jill E . Fisc h, Teaching Corpo rate Governan ce Through Sha reh old e r Litigation, 34 Ga. L.
Rev . H3 (2000) (di scuss ing Kahn's holding a nd its significance).
153 . Sec5 94A.2dat 59.
154. See Ed\,·ard B. R oc k, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorjJOral.e Law !York.', 44 UCL<\. L. REV.
I 009, I I 02 (199 7) (explaining that "the D elaware legi slature a nd coum cannot promul gate ex ante the
standJ.rds to gO\·ern new situatio ns until they sec a vari ety o f cases a nd figure out how well o r badly peo ple
behaved").
155. See, e.g., Kamar, supra no te 5.
156. Ehud K a m a r, fo r example, a rgu es that indete rminacy subjec ts co rpo rate decision makers to the
ri sk o f cos tl y sancti o ns such as liability for money damages. See Ehud K a mar, Sharelwlder Litigation Under
lndeterminal.e Corporale Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 , 892-96 ( 1999).
15 7. See, e.g., CarlS. Bjerre, Note, Evaluatuzg the New Director Etculpati.on Statulu, 73 CORl'iELL L. REv.
786 (1988) (desc ribing protectio n o f co rporate decision makers und er exculpation statutes).
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provisions . 15 B As a result, decisionmakers may not face a substantial risk
of personal monetary liability under indeterminate legal rules. 159 To the
extent that a court's ex post application of a muddy rule results in
injunctive relief, the injunction may simply have the effect of instructing
the corporation as to the legal limits on its conduct. Thus, for example,
if directors adopt a poison pill of questionable validity, the court's
decision to strike it down is more informational than punitive, and the
directors are unlikely to be worse off as a result of the decision than if
they had decided not to adopt the pill in the first place.
B. The Value qf Responsiveness

At the recent Business Associations session of the Annual "tvieeting of
The Association of American Law Schools, Ron Gilson observed that
corporate law matters when the real world changes. 100 The evolution
of Delaware case law reflects the truth of this observation. Delaware's
law of fiduciary duties in the takeover context was the product of the
frenzied takeover market of the late 1970s and early 1980s, including
the extensive use ofjunk bond financing, public concern about the effect
of corporate mergers on labor and community members, and the
development by corporate management of a range of antitakeover
devices. As the independent board of directors grew in importance, and
shareholders began to rely on the independent board to monitor
management decisionmaking, the Delaware courts responded by
developing the scope of the duty of care and the circumstances under
which the business judgment rule would protect board decisions.
Recent controversies between large shareholders and management over
the potential conflict bet\-veen shareholder voting power and
management authority over corporate decisionmakingpresent questions
such as the legality of the dead hand poison pill and the permissibility
of shareholder rights bylaw amendments. 16 1
D elaware's lawmaking process is ideally suited to respond to
developments in the business world. First, Delaware is able to respond
quickly. Although courts can, by nature, respond more rapidly than
legislatures to a new development-the filing of a lawsuit is all that is
158. See, e.g., DEL. COD E A,'\TN . ti t. 8, § 145 ( 1999) (permittin g ind emnifi catio n so lo ng as o f1ic c r or
d irector ac ted in goo d fa ith); if Waltu ch v. C o ntic ommodity Se rvs., Inc., 88 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1996)
(interpretin g Delawa re indemnificatio n sta tute to require good faith ).
15 9. Cf Kam a r,

supra no te 156, a t 895-96 (arguing that ri sk o f liability co nstra ins be havi o r of

co rpora te fiduciari es).
160 . See Commen !S at the AALS Sectio n on Business Association s, Washington , D .C. (Jan. 6, 2000).
161. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Siocklwlder-Adopted By,-Laws: Taking Back Ute
Slreee, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1998) (evaluating shareholder righ!S bylaws under D e la ware la w).
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required to trigger the lawmaking process-the traditional common law
process is slow. 162 The unique features ofDelawarejudiciallawmaking,
including the activism of the courts and the limited role of stare decisis,
allow Delaware to overcome this problem. Rather than considering
themselves constrained by an evolutionary lawmaking process, 16:1
Delaware courts respond with the type of broad and aggressive
lawmaking more commonly seen in legislatures and administrative
agencies. 164 Procedural features of the Delaware courts enhance their
responsiveness, including the courts' historic receptiveness to requests for
expedited proceedings 165 and their willingness to issue rulings quickly in
the context of a fast-paced business transaction. 166 The specialized
caseload and the overall small size ofDelaware's dockets further add to
the judiciary's ability to respond quickly. 167
Second, Delaware is able to respond in a preliminary fashion to initial
developments , which enables it both to signal the potential legal
response to the business community and to await the development of
further information in response to that signal. The procedural context
of many chancery court decisions, in which the court is ruling on a
request for expedited relief, allows the court to provide tentative
guidance about a fast-paced business development while awaiting a full
factual record before committing itself. Similarly, the courts can use
their standards based fiduciary principles to defer the development of
bright line rules.
Delaware's analysis of dead hand poison pills illustrates this process.
The first legal guidance on the subject was issued by the chancery court
in Carmody v. Toll Brothers, lnc. 168 The court narrowly held, in the context
of a motion to dismiss, that dead hand pills were subject to challenge

162. See, e.g., Issac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Ana[ysis of Legal Rulmwking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 279 (197+) (desc ribing common law process as too slow to keep up with th e need for lega l
change resulting from growth in eco nomic activity).
163. See Fisch, supra note 23 , at 1118 (ex plaining that "adjudicative lawmaking is typically
evolutionary").
164. Su Erlich & Posner, supra note 162 at 279-80 (describing legislatures and administrative agencies
as able to change the law more quickly, in part because they are not bo und by principles of stare decisi s).
165. See Kurt M. Heyman, Etpeditcd Proceedings in the Delaware Courl of Chancery: Things of the Past?, 23
DEL.j. CORP. L. 145 (1998) (explaining how the Delaware courts have developed a reputati o n for be ing
willing and able to hear litigants on a expedited basis and to render decisions quickly). But see id. at 156
(sugges ting that thi s receptiveness may be decreasing).
166. See, e.g., Black, supra note 13, at590 (describing "qui ck judicial decisions" in D elaware) .
167. Neil Komcsar obse rves that lawmaking institutions arc able to operate more effectively when
they are not burdened by excessive demands for their services. See NEIL K . KO.\!ESAR, LAw's LIMITS
(forth co ming 2000). Th e subject matter limitations on the Chance ry court's jurisdictio n as well as
Delaware's small size keep th e size of the Chance I)" court d ockets small relative to those of tri a l courtjudges
in states such as New York or California.
168. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del Ch. 1998).
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both under th e Delaware statute and under fiduciary principles.
Additionally, the court explicitly observed that it had no occasion to
consider whether a pill of limited duration would present similar
problems to the pill in the case at bar. 159 A subsequent Chancery Court
decision, lvfentor Graphics Corp. v. Quicktum Design ~stems) Inc., 17 0 struck
down a variation, a "no-hands" poison pill of limited duration, on
narrow fiduciary duty grounds. 17 1 Finally, on the appeal of the A1entor
Graphics decision, 172 the D elaware Supreme Court, working with the
benefit of a full trial and an opportunity for appellate review, addressed
the broader legal principle underlying both these decisions. The
supreme court concluded that the pill 's restrictions on subsequentlyelected directors' ability to redeem the pill and sell the co mpany
conflicted with the board's statutory power under Delaware section
14l(a).m
With respect to many legal issues, the Delaware Supreme Court never
provides such definitive resolution. Although appellate courts are
generally viewed as playing a greater lawmaking role than trial courts,
the exigencies of the business world, in many cases, force the chancery
court to be the primary lawmaker. Thus, as Ron Gilson has explained,
during the 1980s, the rapid transactional demands in the takeover
market resulted in the resolution of many cases before they could be
reviewed by the supreme court. 174 This caused the Chancery Court to
be "the court of first and last resort for many takeover contests." 175
Third, Delaware courts anticipate the effect ofbusiness developments
and try to develop responsive legal principles. Procedurally, as noted
above, the Delaware courts structure the temporal reach of their
decisions in a manner that extends beyond the case at bar. The courts
seem to be deliberately designing rules for future business transactions.
Indeed, as Doug Branson has observed, the Delaware courts selfconsciously instruct the business community as to future legal standards
through lecturing tools such as roadmaps and dicta. 176

169. See id. at 1195 n.52.
170. 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998).
171. See ul. at 38 n.53 (explaining that, because the pill was invalidated on fiduciary duty grounds,
it was unnecessa ry fo r the court to address alternative arguments that it was invalid).
172. See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
173. See ul. at 1290-91 (conc luding that delayed redemption provision violates "fundamental
Delaware
174.
175.
176.

law").
See Gilson , supra note 131, at915.
ld. a t91 6.
See Branson, supra note 20, at I 04-1 OS (desc ribing "roadmap case"); Charles M. Elson, TlzeDu!J
of Care, Compensation and Stock Ownership, 63 U. C!i\. L. REV. 649, 677 (1995) (explaining tha t Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Smith u. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), "served to create a number of
new and impo rtant guideposts to 'informed' [Board] decisionmaking").
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It is possible to understand the Delaware Supreme Court's decision
in Smith v. Van Gorkam 177 in this way. Van Gorkam generated a tremendous
amount of controversy, even criticism, about the court's decision to
subject the independent directors to personal liability for violating the
duty of care. 178 Yet the court's decision can be seen as an early signal of
concern about the degree of oversight exercised by independent
directors. 179 .M oreover this signal anticipated, by several years,
recognition by the investment community of the ri sks posed by
independent directors who do not devote sufficient attention to
corporate decisions. 180
Finally, Delaware can fine-tune and even replace its preliminary
attempts at regulation if further developments demonstrate that the
initial rules are problematic. Both the standards based approach, which
permits easy adjustment to new situations, and the other elements of
Delaware's flexible use of precedent, allow it easily to adjust legal
doctrine. As noted above, this flexibility is a function of the atypical
nature of Delaware corporate decisional law and causes the chancery
courts, in particular, to act something like administrative agencies. 181
The courts' developed corporate law expertise allows them to assess the
impact of their decisions. The facility with which Delaware courts can
change doctrine allows them to respond to their assessment that a prior
approach was unworkable or reflected a poor policy judgment.

C. Political Advantages qf]udicial Lawmaking
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, Delaware relies heavily
on its courts to develop principles of corporate law, and Delaware courts
make law in an unusual way. Why is this structure advantageous to

177. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
I 78. See El so n , supra note 176, at676 n.52 (desc ribin g criticisms of co urt's decisio n).
179. This signal was not si lenced by the D elaware legislature' s adoption of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ l 02(b)(7 ). Although corporations are now statutorily auth otized lO eliminate some types o f director
liability, the default rule still imposes liability, and no t every corporation o pts out of the default rule. See
Ayres, supra no te 143, at 1412. Moreover, the statute docs not permit li ab ility to be eliminated fo r breaches
of the duty of loyalty, acts in bad faith, or acll for whic h the director derive s an imprope r perso na! benefit.
Se.e R. Franklin Balotti & Mark]. Gentile, Eliminalwn or Limilation rifDirecwr Liabiliryfor Delaware Corpora/ions,
12 DEL.j. COR!'. L. 5, ll (1987) (p rovid in g tec hnica l analysis o f § I02(b)(7)).
I 80. See, e.g.,Judith H. D o brzynsk i, W'hen Direclors Play lvfusical Chairs, N.Y.TI~!ES, Nov. 17, 1996 , §
3, I (desc ribin g "trophy directors," well-connec ted, high-pro file in dividua ls who si t on multiple board s but
provide questionable value); Jill E. Fisc h ,

TaJd.ng Boards Seri.ou.s[y, 19 CARDOZO L.

REV. 265, 270 (1997)

(describing efforts by commentators and instituti o nal investo rs to increase directo r participation through
limiting board positions and compensation in centives) .
181. The analogy to administrative agencies is based bo th o n the specialization of the chancery
courts, see supra notes 118-121 and accompanying text, an d o n their structure, see infra notes 2 I 1-214 and
accompanying text.

I
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Delaware corporations? This article has argued that Delaware is able
to use its courts to fine-tun e its legal rules in response to business
developments in a manner that is more difficult through the legislative
process. It has also argued that the D elaware courts are highly
respons1ve.
Other commentators have, however, emphasized the responsiveness
of the Delaware legislature as one of the particul a r advantages of
D elaware incorporation.' 8'2 M oreover, ifDelaware'sjudiciallawmaking
rese mbles legislation, why not rely on the legislative process? This
section argues th at Delaware's lawmaking structure offers advantages
over the legislative process by providing superior access, reducing
political influence, and increasing transparency. These attributes give
D elaware's lawmaking structure comp arative advantages with respect
to the development of corporate law principles.
Neil Komesar has done some of th e most extensive analysis of
institutional competence and co mpara tive institutional advantage. 183
Komesar suggests that legislative and judicial lawmaking may each have
strengths and weaknesses, but that careful analysis should consider the
relative competence of each institution . In particular, legislatures may
suffer from undue political influence , distortions due to rent-seeking, and
the ability of well-organized interest groups to control the flow of
information and, to some extent, the legislative agenda. 184 Courts in
general, and the Delaware courts in particular, may be less susceptible
to these weaknesses. Moreover, the particular dynamics of corporate
litigation give courts specific advantages a,s lawmakers.
One obvious advantage ofjudicial lawmaking in the business area is
that it is litigant driven. In essence, the business community has control
over the lawmaking agenda to a degree that cannot be obtained through
efforts at legislative influence. Legislators can simply refuse to respond
to a lawmaking request, deciding that the transaction is too difficult to
understand , that it is improper to cater to business interests by making
more co rporate law rules, or that the interests of other constituencies
have a more urgent claim on the lawmaking resources. Although the
D elaware legislature has traditionally been very responsive to corporate
requests for rulemaking, many other state legislatures have been less
responsive, resulting in out-of-date and unworkable corporate statutes. 185

132. See, e.g., Kao uris, sufJra no te I, at 973 (desc ribing respo nsive ness of De lawa re legislature to
corpo rate needs); Rom an o, supra note 5, at 233-+ 2 (co ndu cting em piri ca l analysis of responsiveness o f
De la"'are legisla ture).
183. See K omesar, supra note 77.
184. See id. a t 53-97 .
185. See, e.g., Simeon Gold & Don na Killmon, AmendmenL! tnNew York's Business CorjJoralion Lo.w, N .Y.
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In contrast, business litigants can essentially force the court to evaluate
the legality of a new type of transaction by bringing the issue to court.
Komesar argues that the costs of participation represent an important
consideration in comparing alternative lawmaking institutions. 186 He
warns that courts are at a comparative disadvantage relative to the
political process because of the variety ofbarriers to participation in the
legal system, particularly in cases in which stakes are small and widely
dispersed. 187 Komesar suggests that it is generally easier and less
expensive for consumers and voters to register their preferences through
the political process. 188
Particular attributes of corporate law suggest, however, that litigation
may offe r advantages over the political process in terms of participant
access to lawmaking. Many participants in corporate litigation are large
corporations, the type of sophisticated, large stakes, participants for
which the access barriers associated with adjudication are unlikely to
pose a substantial burden. 189
Shareholders are the other major participants in corporate litigation.
Komesar's analysis would seem more applicable to shareholders, but
corporate litigation relies on a variety of substantive and procedural
rules that affirmatively empower shareholders, increasing their access to
the lawmaking process in a way that is not replicated in the political
process. Mechanisms such as the shareholder derivative suit and the
class action enable dissatisfied shareholders to challenge corporate
decisionmaking. 1g0 Most importantly, the rules for shareholder litigation
free individual shareholders from responsibility for funding the costs of
litigation. A range of fee shifting structures enable courts to award
attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs, allocate responsibility for fees to
the corporation, or assess fees against the trial judgment or settlement
proceeds. 191 By allowing entrepreneurial plaintiff's la·wyers to fund

LJ. , Aug. 14, 1997, at 1 (describing the New York co rporate statute prio r lO newly adopted amendments
as "arcane" and "a deficient and innexible tool").
186. See Komcsar, supra note 77, at 127.
187. See id. at 125-28.
188. See id.
189. See it!. at 12 6-2 8 (describing costs of participation in the adjudicative process).
190. In corpo rate law, these mechanisms effec tively address Komesa r's concern abo ut the effect of
skewed distribution of sta kes on use of the adjud icative process. See id. at 130-33. This is du e, in part, to
the large attorneys' fee awards that are available in corporate litiga tion.
191 . See, e.g.,John C. Colfcc,J r., Undestanding the Plaintijf's Atwrruy: The lmplicaiions ifEconomic Theory

for

Privat~

Enforcement

if Law

Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 670 n.2 (1986)

(desc ribing legal rules that lead to these results).
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shareholder litigation, 192 these rules permit shareholders with limited
funds to challenge corporations with substantial assets.
wloreover, the political process is poorly suited for participation by
investors and competing business interests such as potential acquirers.
Because of the structure of corporate law, only businesses resident in or
incorporated in a state will have sufficient interest or ability to
participate in the political process. Resident corporations can and do
participate in the legislative process effectively, 193 but this participation
is, for the most part, not possible for other affected groups. Shareholders
invest in a variety of corporations that are not incorporated in their
home state. Even if an investor's stake were sufficient to make
participation in the political process rational, dispersed nonresident
shareholders are unlikely to have any influence with the legislature in
the state ofincorporation. 194 Given individual investors' relatively small
stakes as well as the dispersion of corporate domiciles, investors are even
less likely to attempt to buy political influence by making political
contributions to out of state legislators. Out of state businesses may have
larger stakes, but are similarly likely to lack political influence in a state
in which they are not a resident. Moreover, even if political activism
were viable, a potential acquirer is unlikely to be able to anticipate
where a future target will be incorporated. 195 Accordingly, although the
litigation playing field between corporate defendants and shareholder
challengers may not be level, given that shareholder participation in the
political process is likely to be nonexistent, shareholders clearly achieve
greater voice through litigation.
In addition, various aspects of Delaware law facilitate shareholder
access to the litigation process. Delaware imposes less onerous
procedural burdens than many other states on shareholders seeking to
initiate derivative suits. For example, Delaware does not require

192. See, e.g. ,John C. Coffee,] r., The Reguu!lion ofEntrepreneurial Liligation: Balrmc1ng Fairness and EJfo:ienry
in the Lmge Cl.n.rs Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) (describing economic structure of entrepreneurial
shareholder litigation); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Refonn, Qyi Tam and the Role ofthe Plaintiff, 60 L. & COi\.TE\IP.
PROBS. 167, 170-74 (1997) (explaining how shareholder litigation has evolved away from traditional
litigation model).
193. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Future ifHostile T akovers: LeJ;islatiun and Public Opinion, 57 U. ClN.
L. Rev. 45 7, 461 (1988) (describing innuencc of local corporations in persuading state legislatures to adopt
antitakem·er statutes).
19+. Voting is the traditional manner by which large dispersed groups exercise political power. See
Kosmeser, Jupm note 77, at 74 . Nonresident shareholders cannot vote in the state ofincorporation. Indeed
few investors can vote in Delaware.
195. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 28, at 1176 (explaining that potential bidder is less likely
than potential target to care· about innuencing Delaware law, because the law will only a!Tect the bidder
if it decides to bid for a Delaware target).
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plaintiffs to post security for expenses, 19 G and makes it easy for plaintiff
shareholders to serve nonresident directors. 197 Delaware law makes it
more difficult for a corporate board to dismiss shareholder-initiated
litigation. 198 Delaware courts have been generous in granting plaintiff
requests for a ttorneys' fe es in connection with shareholder suits. 1'J<l
Some commentators even argue that Delaware decisional law reflects
a pro-shareholder bias. 200
A second advantage of judicial lawmaking is its indep en dence from
political influence. Large public corpo ra tions have substantial funds
available to influence political decisionmaking, and they do not hesitate
to use these funds. 201 Many commentators have expressed concern tha t
corporations can exert a distorting influence on the political marketplace
by drowning out competing arguments through extensive political
spending. 202 Indeed , the United States Supreme Court has upheld th e
regulation of corporate political expenditures based, in part, on the
particular threat of political domination. 203 D espite existing regulation,
corporations have a variety of avenues of political influence available.
Corporations can and do influence political campaigns through political
action committees (PACs) and soft money contributions to the national

196. See, e.g., Macey & Mill e r, supra note 5 , a t 511 (contrasting Delaware wi th New Yo rk,
Pennsylvania , Flo rida and California, all of which require the posting o f a bond).
197. Su iJ. at 511-12 (ex plaining how D elaware legislature rapidly respo nded to co ntinue this
a pproach after Delaware sequestration statute was ruled unco nstitution a l).
198. Set, e.g., William T. Quillen , The Federal-State Corporate Law Relationship-A Response Ia Professor
Seligman's Cnllfor Federal Pmmpti.on rf Stal.e Corporate FiducW.ry Lmv, 59 BROOK. L. R£v. I 07, 12 1 ( 1993)
(describing De laware hurdles to dismissal as "prodigio us" and more onerous th a n those imposed by se veral
courts outside of Delawa re).
199. See, e.g., Andrew G.T. Moo re, II , Slwrehai.Iler R ighisStil/Aliz•e and Well in Delaware: 17u DmvativeSuiL'
A Death Greatly Emggerated, 38 ST. Lours LJ. 94 7, 958-59 (1994) (describing gene rosity of De laware's
approach to awarding attorneys' fee s in derivative suits and explaining that attorney is ent itled to a fee if
he or she can show any benefit to the corporation , mone tary o r no nmoneta ry); Skeel, sujml no te 59, at 23
(explaining that Delaware is "notably generous in granting atto rneys' fees in shareho ld e r su its").
200. See Branson, supra no te 20, at l 05 (finding evidence supports hypothesis that D eLnvare law ha5
both substantive and proced ural pro-shareholder biases).
201. See, e.g., Matt K eller, Ending Greenback Politics, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 21, 2000, at 12 (revea ling
that soft money donations in the 1996 el ectio ns totaled S262 milli o n); Ann Reilly Dowd, L!ok H'lw 's Cashing
in on Congress, MONEY, Dec. 1997, at 128 (desc ribing th e amount and influen ce o f co rporate soft mo ney
contributions to political acti o n co mmitte es).
202. See, e.g., Andrew Sta rk , Strange Bedfellows: Two Parruloxes in Constitutional Discourse Over corporate and
lndiviJua.l Political Activiry, 14 CARDOZO L. R EV. 1343, 1370-72 (1993) (d escribing th e a rgum e nts tha t
co rpo rate political spe ndin g co rrupts the political marketplace); David R. Lagasse , Note, Un due lnjluence:
Corpora/e Polilical Speech, Power and the Initialive Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 134 7, 1349 (1995) (arguing that
co rporations can control o utcome of initiative votes because o f their ability to outspend other gro u ps).
203. See Austin v. Michigan St. Chamber of Com. , '~ 9 4 U .S . 652, 658-59 (1990) (finding that
corporate spending can unfairly influence elec tions); see also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 5 77-78
(1957) (explaining the fear that co rpora tio ns will usc their raw economic powe r to buy influence with
elected officials to advance their interests over those of the public).
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political panies. 204 State campaign fin ance laws, are, in many cases
more p ermissive than federal law in allowing direct corporate
expenditu res in connection with state elections. Finally, corporations
exe rt extensive political pressure through lobbying, which is not subject
to the legal restrictions that apply to election contributions and
.
expe n d nures.·
Commentators have observed how interest groups may influence the
legislative process. 20 G The ability of politicians to extract funds from
corporations creates the potential for legislators to extract rents through
regulation. This focus on rent extraction , in addition to imposing
substantial costs on political participants, can distort the ultimate choice
of legal rules. 207 Indeed, although legislative lawmaking is sometimes
defended as the product of more compl ete inform ation than that which
is available to co urts, 20 B the interes t group dynamics in corporate
iawmaking prese nt particular risks of distortion because in-state
corpora tions, as th e only effective political participants, can manipulate
the information available to political decisionmake rs. 209
Judges obviously are not subj ect to the same types of direct political
influence as legislators.210 Ethical rules and prohibitions on ex parte
co mmunications prohibit litigants from lobbying judges. D elaware
~O'i

204. See, e.g., Kell er, supra note 201, at 12 (explaining how the "soft money loophole " allows
corporations to circumvent legal li mits on politica l co ntributi ons); Adam \Vinker, Election Law As Its Own
Field of Study· 77u Corporalion '!)-Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1243, 1265 (1999) ("Corporation are
a ll owed to use shareh old er funds to crea te and adm inister co rporate PACs, and make unregulated and
unlimited so ft money contributions to th e national political parties from their general treasuries.") (c itations
om itted).
205. See Adam Winkl er, Beyond Bellolli, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 133, 168-69 (1998) (explaining that
compaign finance laws do not re stri ct cm·porate lo bbying, o n which ofte n spend much mo re than on
initia tives o r ca ndidate ca mpaigns); Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Aionster Hits thL Campaign TraiL· An Approach
to Regulolion of Corporate Political £,penditures, 32 W!>-·1. & MARY L. REV. 587, 597n. 63 (1991 )(d esc ribing
co rporate lob bying). In deed, until 1993, section l 62(e) o f the inte rn al revenu e cod e allowed a tax
ded uction for co rporate lobbying expe nses. See S hannon Kin g, Note, The Lobbying Deduction Disallowance:
Policy Consi1lerations, Comparisons and Structuring Aclizities Under Amended Section 162(e), 15 VA. T fu"X REv. 551,
552 (1996) (desc ribin g elimina ti o n o f the tax deduc ti o n for co rpo rate direct lobbyi ng expenses).
206. Se<, e.g. , Ca rney, supra note 5 at 716 (citing co ncerns ex pressed ove r interest group innu cnce over
corpo rate law); Komesar, sujmi note 77, at54-75 (ex plaining interest gro up theory of politics and detailing
ways in whi ch interest groups can exert innuen ce over politica l process).
207. See, e.g., Carney, suf;ra note 5 a t 7 17 (desc ribing rent-see king in co nnecti o n with the produc ti o n
o f co rporate law and de sc ribing rent-see king prob lem as greatest with res pect to management spo nsored
changes in co1-po 1·ate rules).
208. Cf Sau l M. Pi !chen, Politics v. tk Cloister: Dmding When tkSupreme Cowt Should Defer to Congmsional
Factjinding Under tk Post-Cu•il vVar Amendments, 59 NOTRE DA!\fE L. REV. 337, 375 -76 (1984) (c riti qu ing the
argu ment tha t the legisl ative investigative apparat us is superi or and that, as a result, legislatures a re better
factfin ders than co urts).
209. See Komesar, supra note 77, a t 62 -63 (exp laining how concentrated gro ups with large stakes can
prese nt distorted pictures of the publi c interes t to political o ffi cia ls).
210. See id. at 124 (desc ribing structure of judicial ind ependence).
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judges also enjoy an unusual degree of political independence relative
to other state judges. Delaware is one of only twelve states to use
appointed rather than elected judges. 211 Both chancery and supreme
court judges are appointed, based on a system of merit selection, for
renewable twelve year terms, 21 2 thereby insulating the courts, to a large
degree, from the political pressures that judges in other states may
face. 213 Finally, the Delaware Constitution mandates balance between
the two major political parties in appointment of Delaware judges .2 14
These factors contribute to insulating Delaware judges relative to
legislators from political influence.
A comparison ofDelaware's legislative and judicial lawmaking in the
takeover area provides some support for the hypothesis that Delaware's
judiciary is subject to less political influence than its legislature. The
political process le ading to state adoption of anti takeover statutes has
been widely analyzed. 21 5 Commentators have observed that state
antitakeover legislation was widely adopted in response to local
corporations seeking protection from hostile bidders. 2 16 As Romano
explains, antitakeover statutes "are frequently pushed through the
legislature at the behest of a major local corporation that is the target of
a hostile bid or apprehension that it will become a target." 217 Delaware
was not exempt from this process; indeed the Delaware statute was the

21 1. See Martin Sco tt Drigge rs,] r. , Soutlz Carolina's £,-perimenL· Legis/alive Conlrol '!f]udicinllvltril Seleclion,
't9 S.C . L. REv. 1217, 1222 n.39 (1998) (citing Delaware as o ne of nine states in which judges arc appointed
by the governor; in three others, the legislature appoints judges). Because many states use a co mbination
of method s in se lecting their judiciary, some sources cl assify states differe ntly. See id. at 1222 , n.38. See also
Edwin Chemerinsky, Presening an lndependenl)udiciary: The Needfor Conlribulion rmd Etpenditures Limils in Judicial
Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 3 (1998) (explaining that state judges are elected in 23 states and face
periodic rete nt ion electio ns in fifteen other states).
212. Delaware Const. of 1897, Art. 4, § 3. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supm no te 26, at 835 (de sc ribing
d evelopment of Co ns titutional provisions for appointment o f Delaware judges); Moscow, supra note 57, at
19 17 (explaining the structure of the Delaware Supreme Court).
2 13 . See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington,Judicinl Independence Md Democralu Accounuibili!Y in Highesl Su1/.e Courls,
61 LAw & CONIEMP. PROBS. 79 (1998) (discussing degree to whi ch election of state judges may subj ect
judicial dcc isionmaking to political influence).
214. DEL. Co:--.:sT. an. I.V., § 3. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale For Judicial
DecisonmaJ:ing in Corporau UIUJ, 53 BUS. LAW. 681 ( 1998) (describing se lection process fo r D e laware judges).
215. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Pulilical Economy ofTakover Slal.utes, 73 VA. L. REV. Ill (1987)
(expl o ring politics behind enactment o f C onnecti c ut anti takeover statute); R o mano, mpra note 192, at 461
(describing political process leading to ad option of state antitakcover statutes); Carne y, supra note 5, at 7505 I (desc ribing process of enacting state anti takeover statutes).
216. See, e.g., Carney supra note 5, at 750-51 (listing co rporate sponsors of state antitaknwer statutes);
R o mano, supra note 192, at 461 n. 11 (citing examples of statutes passed in response to pressure imposed
by local corporations on state legislatures).
217. Roman o, supra note 193, at 461; set also Romano, supra note 215, at 120 (describing the po litical
process by which Ae tna en listed the support of the Connecticut Business and Industry Association to lobby
effectively for the adoption of an anti takeover statute in Connecticut).

2000]

ROLE OF THE DELA vVARE COURTS

1095

product of corporate influence and lobbying efforts. 218 The result of this
political influence is legislation that uniformly favors the interests of
corporate management. 219 Although state antitakeover statutes vary in
the extent to which they limit the potential for a hostile takeover, in all
cases, the statutes, including Delaware's antitakeover statute, make
takeovers more difficult.
In contrast, courts have responded to takeover litigation with an
attempt to balance deference to management decisionmaking with
concern over shareholder treatment. 220 The result, in Delaware, is a
series of decisions 221 that increase the degree of judicial scrutiny and
heighten management obligations beyond the traditional business
judgment rule analysis. 222 In other words, corporate management has
been able to obtain more favorable takeover regulation in the legislature
than in the courts. This outcome is likely the result of the greater
opportunity for potential target corporations to influence lawmaking
through the political process than through litigation.
Finally, judicial decisionmaking has the advantage of greater
transparency than legislative lawmaking. The specific effects of
corporate influence in politics are difficult to identify. Disclosure of
corporate political spending is spotty and incomplete.
.Nlore
importantly, the substantive arguments that corporations make to
legislators through lobbying and political spending are made in private,
with no forum for response or public debate. The political process thus
creates a real possibility that legislators will not receive a balanced
perspective or even hear both sides of an issue. 223 When legislators

218. See Romano, Jupra note 193, at 462-64 (describing adoption of Delaware statute and lobbying
by corporate executives over the legislation).
219. Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell explain that the political process is poorly suited to reflect the
views of those who oppose anti takeover legislation. In addition to shareholders, who face collective action
problems, prospective bidders are likely to oppose restrictions on takeovers. Yet, because antitakcover
statutes protect targcl';, not bidders, a prospective acquirer is unlikely to lind it useful to oppose anti takeover
legislation even in ilS home state, since it cannot predict which state's law will apply to a future acquisition.
See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 28, at 1176-77.
220. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 106, at 152 n. 75 (describing Rwlon and Unocal decisions as
acknowledging the importance of shareholder prerogative and management discretion).
221. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
5 71 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); and Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
222. See Paul L. Regan, Great E>:pecltllions? A Con/mel Lnw Ana!Jsir.for Preclusive C!JTjlorale Lock-ups, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 97 (1999) (describing Delaware takeover law as providing that board decisions
approving change of control will be subjected to substantive judicial review without any threshold showing
by stockholder that board breached il'; fiduciary duty); cf. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions,
Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law) (placing the initial burden on the plaintiff to
prove a director's breach of fiduciary duty in a takeover situation).
223. See Komesar, supra note 77, at 63 (explaining how concentrated groups can distort information
about the public interest and mislead even a public-interested public official).
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decide to act, the legislative process provides a poor record of the basis
for the legal rules that are enacted. Legislative history is incomplete and
readily manipulated. 224 vVithout an indication of why legislators made
their decisions, it is more difficult for critics to challenge the resulting
laws.
Judicial lawmaking is far more transparent than legislative
lawmaking. The adversary process provides a mechanism for presenting
both sides of an issue to the decisionmaker. The litigation process itself
is open to the public, and the pendency oflegal questions is a matter of
public record . Even nonlitigants have the opportunity to ensure that the
court has the benefit of full information on an issue by submitting
amicus briefs. Finally, by making law through the process of issuing
written opinions, judges provide the business community and the public
with an explanation of the reasons for their decisions. 225 Because th e
Chancery courts are courts of equity they sit without juries and maintain
a tradition ofissuingwritten opinions. These practices distinguish them
from trial courts in other states.

IV. THE ANALYSIS .APPLIED-INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM
Institutional activism provides a case study with which to apply the
foregoing analysis and consider Delaware's ability to respond to changes
in the business world. The activism of institutional investors represents
a major and relatively recent business development. Institutions are
becoming increasingly involved in corporate governance. 226 Institutions
have experimented with negotiation, litigation, and shareholder voting
as tools for influencing corporate decisionmaking on topics ranging from

224. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory lnterjmlation, 17 HAR V.J.L.
& PUB . POL'Y 61 (1994) (s tating that legislative hi story is "slanted, drafted by the staff a nd perhaps by
private interest groups"); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use qf Legislative History, 1987 DUKE LJ.
37!, 376 (1987) (c laiming that the grea tes t concern about le gislative history is "its potential for
manipulati on"); Danie l A. Farber & PhilipP. F rickey, Legi.rlall:Ve Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423,
423 ( 1988) (explaining how legislawrs and legislative stafT members can insert false ra tionales for legislation
into legislative repo rts) .
225. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, OjJiJZivns as Rub, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1465-66 (1995)
(e xplaining how judicial op ini ons provide litigants an d th e public with explanati ons of the results reach ed);
see genaal!y Frederick Schauer, Curing Reasons, 4 7 STAN. L. RE.v. 633 ( 1995) (examining extent to which legal
decisionmakers give reasons for their dec isions).
226. See, e.g., Mark R . Winge rso n & Christopher H. D o rn, lnstitutionallnuestors in the US. and tlu: Repeal
q[Poison Pills: A Practitioner's Perspective, 1992 COLU:"vl. Bt..;S. L. REV. 223, 226-235 (1992) (d escribing recen t
increase in institutio nal investor activism and detailing strategies employed by institutional investors to
affect corpo rate governa nce).
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executive compensation to boa rd composition to corporate employment
policies. 227
The academy is sharply divided on the implications of institutional
activism for firm value.22 8 O n the one hand, activism offers the
possibility of reducing agency costs through the involve ment of
sophisticated monitors with substantial stakes.229 On the other hand,
institutional interests may differ from those of other inves tors, causing
activism to reduce ove rall firm value. 230 In addition, institutions' access
to managers creates th e possibility for collusion. 231
States can appro ach the issue of institutional activism in several ways.
One possibility is for state lawmakers to dete rmine the app ropri ate level
ofinstitutional participation in corporate gove rnance and to adopt legal
rules tailored toward achieving that level. A second possibility is for
states to maintain the existin g legal allocation of decisionm aking
responsibility, which largely reserves such decisionmaking for corporate
management and limits opportunities for shareholder voice. A third
alternative would expand the opportunities for shareholder voice and
monitoring, with the expectation that institutional activism would
improve corporate de cisionmaki ng. 232
These regulatory approaches have several problems. Each requires
states to make a normative judgment about the appropriate level of
institutional activism. In light of the inability of even academics to agree
on the potential value of institutional participation in corporate
governance, it is unclear that state lawmakers are capable of making this
assessment. Structural flaws in the legislative process are likely further
to detract from legislators' ability to evaluate institutional activism. Like
state antitakeover statutes, regulation addressing institutional activism

227. Su id.
228. Su]ill E. Fisch, Relntionsh'p fm•e.rting· Hli/1 it Hnppm-' Will it H'ark?, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. I 009, I 00911 (1994) (describing academ ic commentary deba ting the like lihood and effec tiveness of in stituti o na l
activism).
229. See, t.g., Bern ardS. Black,AgenLr Watchi.ngAgenLr: Th Promise ifinstilutionul In vestor Voice, 29 UCLA
L. REV. 8 11 (1992) (descri bin g how instituti ona l activism can improve corporate gove rnance); Ronald].
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman , Reinventing tht Outside Director: An Agenda )or Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 863 (199 1) (ad voca ting greater inst ituti o na l activism).
230. Se.e, e.g., R obe rta Romano, Public Pension Fund Acti.tirm in CorfJorate Governance R eco='rfered, 93
COLUM. L. REV . 795, 797-98 (1993) (express in g co ncern th at po liti ca l pressure wi ll ca use publi c pensio n
funds to pursue goals other than maximiz ation o f share valu e).
231. See, e.g., Fisch, o11pra no te 223 , at I 033 -+5 (explain ing potential for institut ional im'estor to pu rsue
pri va te ga ins through activi sm); Edward B. Roc k, Controlling tht Dark Sitk ifRelational Investing, 15 CARDOZO

L. REV. 987, 989-93 ( 1994) (describing pursu it of' private gains as '"corrup t"' relationa l in vesting) .
232. Th is is not unlike the SEC's 1992 ame ndments li bera lizin g the federa l proxy rule s to faci litate
increased shareholder activism through the proxy process. Sa Fisch, mpra note 223, a t I 013-19 (describ ing
amendments as a "direct re sponse to complaints by institutio nal investors tha t the proxy rules prevented
them from . .. pa rticipa ting effectively in co rpora te governa nce").
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is likely to be strongly influenced by interest group dynamics. In
particular, corporate management has an obvious stake in limiting the
degree to which corporate law facilitates institutional activism.
Moreover, institutions are unlikely to be effective counterweights to
management's political influence. Institutions are poorly organized
political actors, with little ability to lobby effec tively. 233 Their political
weakness is evidenced by their relative impotence in connection with
state adoption of anti takeover legislation.
Additionally, responding to institutional activism is responding to a
moving target. As institutions and issuers work through corporate
governance issues, the nature of institutional activism has evolved, and
this evolution is likely to continue. 23+ Even a careful legislative
assessment of the appropriate regulatory approach may rapidly become
out of date as institutions become more sophisticated, more corrupt or
more innovative in their activism.
Finally, clear rules that specify the appropriate degree of institutional
involvement create incentive problems. Rules favoring management
discretion can potentially frustrate institutional attempts to monitor and
can eliminate any incentive on the part of corporate management to
negotiate with institutions. Rules favoring institutions create the
potential for excessive litigation and give institutions a tool that they can
use strategically. Indeed, rules that broadly empower institutions can
lead to rent-seeking and the extraction of private gains.
Delaware law takes a different approach. First, Delaware's muddy
rules encourage institutions and management to bargain over
governance changes rather than litigating or stonewalling. Second,
judicial review of management responses to institutional activism
conducted through the framework of fiduciary principles allows courts
to oversee and respond to changes in the nature of institutional activism.
Judicial review also allows courts to rebalance the legal structure in
response to perceived overreaching on the part of either institutions or
management. The flexibility provided by Delaware law enhances
judicial power to prevent opportunism. This backdrop of judicial
oversight may give the parties increased confidence to negotiate
voluntarily. Finally, judicial lawmaking provides institutions ,\lith

233. See, e.g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., TJu Folldorel!flnves!M CajJilalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1970, 1981 ( 1997)
("Fragmented among tens of thousands of pension and mutual funds, and lacking the lobbying reso urces
of corporate managements, institutional investors are anything but an ef1iciently organized political o r
economic force. Coo rdination among them remains largely ad hoc and crisis-driven.").
234. See, e.g. , Wingcrson & Dom, supra note 226, at 234 (describing how nature of institutional
activism has changed).
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greater access to the lawmaking structure than they are likely to achieve
in the legislature.
V. CONCLUSION
In analyzing regulatory competition in corporate law, commentators
have focused on substantive law.
A comparative institutional
perspective suggests, however, that a regulator can also provide
advantages through its lawmaking process. Because of the inherent
difficulty in evaluating substantive provisions of corporate law and in
tracing incorporation decisions to differences bet:vveen states, 235 a process
oriented approach offers the potential for new insights about the value
of state competition.
Although it has received little attention, Delaware's corporate
lawmaking process addresses systematic challenges in structuring
corporate regulation. These challenges include the difficulty of
assessing the impact of corporate rules on various corporate
constituencies and the problems associated with designing rules that
must function in a rapidly changing business environment. Delaware's
equity courts are able to formulate flexible yet responsive legal principles
that permit transactional evolution without increasing strategic
behavior.
The manner in which Delaware courts maintain an aggressive
lawmaking agenda, focus on articulation of principles to govern future
standards, and freely adjust previously announced principles based on
policy considerations, resembles the legislative process. At the same
time , the standards based muddiness ofDelaware law retains a degree
of ex post review for which courts are well suited. In addition,
Delaware's extensive reliance on judicial lawmaking offers several
advantages over the legislative process, including greater and more
balanced access to the lawmaking process, increased political
independence, and enhanced decisionmaking transparency. This article
has argued that this lawmaking structure is particularly appropriate in
corporate law.
In conclusion, the peculiar role of the Delaware courts may provide
greater explanatory power for Delaware's success in attracting corporate
charters than previously identified theories. Delaware has developed a
unique corporate lawmaking structure and process. If, as this article

235. See, e.g. ,Jill E. Fisch, Picking a Wmner, 20J. CORP. L. 451 (1995) (questi on ing validity of relying
on event studies to evaluate regulatory change).
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suggests, D elaware lawmaking addresses the needs of corporations, it
may explain why Delaware is consistently winning the race.

